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Аннотация. ЕС зависит от России как от основного поставщика, когда речь идет о 
нефти, газе и твердом топливе. Эта зависимость является важным фактором в 
энергетической политике ЕС. Несмотря на то, что в энергетических отношениях между 
ЕС и Россией существует взаимная зависимость, ЕС опасается сбоев в торговле 
энергией. Это отражается в политике ЕС, которая с 2009 года проводится на европейском 
уровне в дополнение к национальной политике. Основой энергетической политики ЕС 
является диверсификация источников энергии, уменьшение зависимости и стремление к 
коллективному европейскому подходу. Достижение последнего оказывается сложным, 
поскольку зависимость от российской энергии глубоко разделяет ЕС. Исходя из своих 
прошлых и экономических целей, государства-члены ЕС по-разному относятся к 
намерениям России. Тем не менее, события 2014 года, похоже, изменили общую 
европейскую перспективу, и с тех пор в ЕС стало больше единства. В конечном счете, 
безопасность энергоснабжения, а вместе с этим и будущее Европы, поставлено на карту. 
 
Ключевые слова: Энергетическая политика, Геополитика, Европейский Союз, Россия, 
Нефть, Природный газ, Ископаемое топливо, Торговля энергией 
 
 
Abstract. The EU is dependent on Russia as main supplier when it comes to oil, gas and solid 
fuels. This dependence is an important factor in the energy policies of the EU. Although there 
is a mutual dependence in the energy relationship between the EU and Russia, the EU fears 
disruptions in the energy trade. This is reflected in EU policy that, since 2009, has been made 
at a European level in addition to national policies. The core of EU energy policy is 
diversification of energy sources, decreasing dependence and a desire for a collective European 
approach. The latter proves difficult, as dependence on Russian energy has deeply divided the 
EU. Based on their past and economic motives, member states have different feelings towards 
Russia’s motives. Nevertheless, events in 2014 seem to have changed the common European 
perspective and there has been more unity within the EU since. After all, the security of energy 
supply, and with that the future of Europe, is at stake.  
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European dependence on Russian energy is an important factor in the energy policies of the 
European Union (EU). Former Vice-President of the Energy Union, Maroš Šefčovič, referred 
to this during the meeting of the European Parliament’s Delegation to the EU-Russia 
Parliamentary Cooperation Committee as “Energy plays a pivotal role in our relations with 
Russia, and Russia plays an important role in our energy policy. In fact, energy has been a 
cornerstone of our economic relations with Russia.”1  
 For nearly five decades, gas and oil trade and to a lesser extent solid fuel trade, have 
been a key feature of relations between (Soviet) Russia and several European states. In the 
1960’s, the Soviet Union started to export large amounts of energy through pipeline systems. 
In the beginning, it was sent to European Comecon states (the economic organization under the 
leadership of the Soviet Union, better known as the “Eastern Bloc”), but later they shipped it to 
Western Europe as well, including members of the European Community and NATO. The 
strategic relevance of Russia as energy supplier increased during the global oil crisis in the 
1970’s. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, East-West energy trade intensified as Russia 
inherited the role of Europe’s main energy supplier because most of the energy reserves and 
extraction facilities are located far away in Russia’s hinterland.2  
Energy is closely related to geopolitics. In energy policy, geopolitical power is defined 
as the state’s capacity to gain control of national energy resources and transportation 
infrastructure, and to use or adjust them as a means to pursue foreign and security policy goals. 
This means that due to deployments of geopolitical power, economic motivations are 
subordinate to political goals.3 This is in particular the case for gas and oil trade. International 
conflicts have often disrupted international oil transactions. The first time this happened was in 
1956, when European oil imports were hampered by the Suez crisis. The temporary closure of 
the Suez Canal was a result of the conflict between the United Kingdom (UK) and France on 
one side and Egypt on the other. When the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) boycotted the oil transport to Western countries in 1973, it was the second international 
oil crisis, but it became known as ‘the First Oil Crisis.’ A new crisis happened a couple of years 
                                               
1 “Speech: The state of play of EU-Russia energy relations,” Europa Nu, published 25 March 2015, accessed 23 
May 2020, https://www.europa-
nu.nl/id/vjsjjrbvpiyy/nieuws/speech_the_state_of_play_of_eu_russia?ctx=via2fu30lxxr 
2 Siddi, Marco, “The Role of Power in EU-Russia Energy Relations: The Interplay between Markets and 
Geopolitics,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 70 (2018): 1552-1571. 
3 Idem.  
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later in 1979 due to a power change in Iran. These crises led to price increases with negative 
economic consequences for oil importing countries. This resulted in a search for new oil fields 
in Europe and the United States (U.S), which proved later successful. Strategic oil stocks were 
set up to allow some months’ supply in case of new trade disruptions and the dependence on 
OPEC considerably decreased.4  
 By contrast, the gas market had been a regional matter for a long time. Gas pipelines are 
not build overnight and once the system lays down both consumer and supplier have a mutual 
interest in the proper functioning of these pipelines. Nevertheless, the history over the past 15 
years has shown that political tensions are also rising in the gas trade, for example between 
Russia and Ukraine where the renewing of gas transportation contracts has led to disruptions in 
gas transit from Russia to Europe. The dispute between both states exposes Europe’s 
vulnerability concerning energy security as they feel the consequences of geopolitical situations 
elsewhere. Within the EU, gas trade has become a main source of controversy and it is one of 
the most politicised topics, despite its lesser economic role compared to European oil trade. The 
topic has deeply divided European member states. Fueled by a long history of Tsarist and Soviet 
domination, Eastern European states have a mistrust regarding Russia as main energy supplier, 
while Western European states have a more pragmatic look on the issue and see opportunities 
in EU-Russian cooperation. This does not alter the fact that since the start of the conflict in 
Ukraine in 2014, fears about possible disruptions in the energy trade with Russia have 
increased, in particular with respect to gas trade as the transport through expensive pipeline 
systems creates a more vulnerable relation than the oil trade that is sold by barrels.5  
 Due to the closure of domestic coal and nuclear power stations, the demand for gas in 
the EU is expected to increase in the coming years. Extra import capacity is needed in order to 
meet this extra demand. This capacity increase is available in the form of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) import terminals and expansion of pipeline capacity for Russian gas. The advantage of 
LNG over the traditional transportation of natural gas is the commercial opportunity because 
expensive pipeline systems are not necessary as LNG is transported overseas from locations 
where gas deposits are in excess. However, the relative high costs of production and the need 
to store it in special tanks have hindered the widespread commercial use so far. The future of 
the EU gas markets depends on a few pipeline projects. Currently under construction are the 
Turk Stream pipeline and North Stream 2. The Turk Stream pipeline will replace the previously 
                                               
4 “Energy is and stays geopolitics,” Energie Podium, published 8 January 2020, accessed 21 May 2020, 
https://energiepodium.nl/artikel/energie-is-%C3%A9n-blijft-geopolitiek-gevoelig 
5 Idem.  
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planned Southstream pipeline allowing gas to be transported directly from Russia to Turkey. 
North Stream 2 allows gas transportation directly from Russia to Germany, bypassing several 
transit states. Both pipelines are controversial as they increase European dependence on Russian 
energy. Critics emphasize the strategic importance of energy exports for the geopolitical 
position of Russia.6 
Typically, the EU is portrayed as a liberal actor in external energy policies, whereas 
Russia is seen predominantly as a geopolitical or realpolitik-driven player. This ignores the 
EU’s regulatory power, which is defined as the ability to formulate, monitor and enforce a set 
of market rules in a jurisdiction. The EU is the world’s largest integrated energy market and 
besides, it contains the European Commission which has a clear and strong enforcement 
capacity in amongst others the energy sector. In this respect, enforcement capacity is essential 
as foreign authorities will have to adapt to regulations. Enforcement tools backing up regulatory 
power may include penalties such as fines or exclusion from a market. Thanks to its regulatory 
institution and its enforcement powers, the EU arguably increased its ability to shape 
international market rules in line with its preferences.7  
In her article “Is Russian Energy Policy towards the EU only about Geopolitics?” 
Tatiana Romanova claims that Russian energy policy is undeniably linked with geopolitics. She 
states that it becomes clear from strategic documents that energy is perceived for a strategic 
course. In Russian policy, security is giving privilege above the market and includes state 
interference, top-down problem solving and ad hoc solutions. Furthermore, she argues that in 
Russian policies, energy is used as a tool to boost internal development and maximize its 
presence in the global economy. Subsequently, she nuances her views by stating that is it too 
simplistic to only consider geopolitical motives. She concludes that Moscow indeed used legal 
and technocratic instruments that fit in the European market approach.8 Marco Siddi, Senior 
Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and expert in EU-Russian 
energy relations partially agrees with her. He argues that EU-Russian energy relations are rather 
commercial than geopolitical because there have been commercial benefits for both sides. 
According to Siddi, the EU has proven to be more effective as a regulatory power than as a 
geopolitical power. The European Commission has been able to influence the planning of new 
infrastructural projects and even limited Gazprom’s monopolistic practices. This proves that 
                                               
6 Shaffer, Brenda, Energy Politics (Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 116. 
7 Siddi, Marco, “The Role of Power in EU-Russia Energy Relations: The Interplay between Markets and 
Geopolitics,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 70 (2018): 1552-1571. 
8 Romanova, Tatiana, “Is Russian Energy Policy towards the EU only about Geopolitics? The Case of the Third 
Liberalisation Package,” Geopolitics 21:4 (2016): 857-879. 
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currently regulatory power and market forces are the most influential drives of EU-Russia 
energy relations. He concludes that energy dependence between the superpowers works as 
interaction, as Russia is the most important energy supplier of the EU, the European market is 
vital for Russia’s energy revenues.9 Umut Turksen, author of the book “EU Energy Relations 
with Russia” has opposing views. According to him, the EU has endeavored to cooperate with 
Russia through bilateral and multilateral platforms, but that Russia continuously resisted these 
initiatives. Contrary to Romanova and Siddi, Turksen concludes that EU’s normative and 
intuitionalist approach is undermined by Russia’s state practices. He continues that there is no 
mutual dependence given the fact that the EU has not managed to diversify its energy sources 
and suppliers.10 The EU itself shares the same conclusions as Turksen. The European 
Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) conducted a study about energy as a tool 
of foreign policy. In their eponymous report, they conclude that Russia’s energy policies are 
shaped by geopolitical motives as well as commercial considerations. Although the policies do 
not solely serve Russia’s foreign policy objectives, Russia is able to exert political pressure 
through energy exports.11  
Although the European dependence on Russian energy has been researched extensively, 
this thesis attempts to link long-term trends in combination with the current state of affairs. This 
link is relevant since this dependence is frequently discussed in European politics, but often in 
combination with current geopolitical relations. Here one responds to emotion without actually 
taking into account the long-term trends. Research into these trends can provide more insight 
into the relationship between the EU and Russia with regard to energy. From a European 
perspective, it is therefore particularly useful to understand the extent to which the EU is really 
dependent and what possible alternatives exist. That the topic is relevant is evident from the 
numerous debates in the European Parliament about the European diversification strategies with 
regard to EU energy imports.12 In addition, there is a debate in both the academic world and on 
the European political scene in which is argued, on the one hand, that Russian energy policy is 
actively pursuing influence. They associate Russia’s energy policies with state control and 
                                               
9 Siddi, Marco, “The Role of Power in EU-Russia Energy Relations: The Interplay between Markets and 
Geopolitics,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 70 (2018): 1552-1571. 
10 Turksen, Umut, EU energy relations with Russia: solidarity and the rule of law (London: Routledge, 2018), 
75.  
11 “Energy as a tool of foreign policy of authoritarian states, in particular Russia, April 2018, accessed 9 May 
2020, AFET committee European Parliament, 35. 




geopolitical ambitions. On the other side of the debate, scholars are convinced that it is a 
question of mutual dependence in which the EU has as much power, if not more, than Russia.  
Based on the above, the following research question has been formulated: How is the European 
dependence on Russian energy characterized and how is this reflected in European energy 
policy?  
The timeframe of this thesis is between 2005 and 2017. Twelve years seems to be a 
relatively short period of time to investigate long-term trends, but it offers a sufficient scope to 
study them. In addition, the EU expanded in 2004 with no fewer than ten new member states. 
Eight of these member states were part of the former Warsaw Pact and with their arrival in the 
EU, the energy landscape changed drastically. Moreover, in 2005 for the first time, real concrete 
steps were taken to formulate a common European energy policy.13 Finally, all relevant data 
related to European energy imports is only up to 2017 and newer date is unfortunately not yet 
publicly available.  
 For this research, data, primary sources and secondary literature will be used. The data 
comes from Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU. The main primary sources are policy 
documents and scientific reports. The documents provide a detailed insight into the positions 
adopted by the EU with regard to Russian energy imports. Also (translated) Russian policy 
documents shall be used to gain insight into the Russian energy market. This thesis is analytical 
in nature, whereby sources and literature are examined critically. The use of news reports is 
limited as much as possible to keep the information as objective as possible. Nevertheless, for 
any text that will be used, it is important to keep in mind the author’s perspective or potential 
agenda as it may affect what they write. Although efforts have been made to write this thesis 
as objective as possible, it is undeniable that it is written from a European perspective, given 
the number of sources from the EU.  
 In order to provide adequate answers to the research question, sub questions will be 
used. Firstly, the context of the European-Russian energy relationship will be discussed, 
focusing on the realization of the current energy policies and the legal framework. The North 
Stream pipeline will also be briefly discussed as a case study. The sub questions that belong to 
this chapter are: What is the context of EU-Russian energy relations? What is the legal 
framework of the EU-Russian energy relationship? The second chapter then discusses the 
European dependence on energy imports itself. In this chapter it becomes clear where the 
energy per European member state comes from and what the influence of Soviet legacy has on 
                                               
13 Green Paper: A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy,” 8 March 2006, accessed 1 
December 2019, Commission of the European Communities, 14. 
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this. The sub questions for this chapter are: Where does European energy originate from? What 
does dependence mean? How does Soviet legacy influence the current EU-Russian energy 
relationship? In the third chapter, European energy imports will be discussed in more detail, 
but only imports from Russia will be considered. In addition, efforts will also be made to explain 
the developments and attention will be paid to the current energy trends in the EU. The sub 
questions for this chapter are: What is the development of oil/gas/solid fuel imports from Russia 
of the EU between 2005 and 2017? How can this development be explained? What are the main 
energy trends in the EU society? This chapter will determine exactly how much energy of every 
sector (oil, gas and solid fuels) is imported from Russia per each member state and what its 
value is for the total European imports. Eventually, this entire overview can be found in the 
appendix. The last chapter turns away from the EU and zooms in on the Russian energy sector. 
The following sub questions will be addressed: How is the Russian energy sector organized? 
How does the Russian energy sector relate to Russia’s domestic politics? How does the Russian 
energy sector relate to Russia’s foreign politics? The emphasis in this chapter will lay on the 
interaction between the Russian energy sector and Russian domestic and foreign policies. 
Finally, in the conclusion the main findings will be summarized and an answer to the research 




Opposed to European energy policy, which is often described as market-based, Russian external 
energy policy is often described as geopolitical. In 1974, the phrase energy geopolitics was first 
used. Rooted in the neorealist tradition of international relations, the approach of energy 
relations focuses on power politics. It does not pay much attention to national politics or 
transnational relations. In this sense, energy is regarded as a strategic commodity instead of an 
average good.  The geopolitical approach is based on top-down centralized decision making. 
This is related with the negative assumption of external dependence and the urge to control it. 
On the other hand, the market approach is based on the neoliberal understanding of international 
relations. This view assumes positive interdependence and the neoclassical market vision in 
which all problems of supply and demand are solved. This approach considers energy as 
commodity like any other. According to the neoliberal understanding, states act as rule-
providers as long as they ensure universal and transparent rules. Neoliberals expect long-term 
and mutual cooperation, while neorealists presuppose competition. There is also a difference in 
how territories are considered. Neorealism is linked to territorial unites (where resources are 
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located, transported and consumed) and to traditional, static forms of organization, while the 
neoliberal approach is not territory-based and involves various transnational actors like 




The emerge of a European Energy Policy out of Hampton Court 2005  
 
Despite several attempts during the 1990’s, the EU did not succeed in creating a common 
energy policy. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, a new impulse for the 
formation of a common EU energy policy came about when a series of key documents such as 
green papers and action plans were published. During the UK Presidency of the European 
Council, British Prime Minister Tony Blair called an informal meeting for the Heads of State 
and Government of the European Union on 27 October 2005. The meeting took place at the 
prestigious Hampton Court Palace, less than 20 kilometers south west of central London. The 
meeting was arranged in order to discuss the ‘future of Europe.’ Prior to the meeting, the 
President of the Commission for European Communities (since 2009 the European 
Commission, also known as ‘the Commission’) José Manuel Barroso prepared a paper on the 
challenges of globalization. The paper was used as foundation of the themes discussed during 
the meeting: global competition, climate change, migration and of course energy.15  
As follow up of the meeting, specific councils devoted to discussing these topics 
organized a number of debates in the aftermath of Hampton Court. In these various ‘Hampton 
Court work streams,’ the Commission and the EU member states shared initiatives and 
information on their efforts. The Energy Council meeting was held on the 1st of December 2005 
and was devoted to the implementation of the internal energy market and its practical impact. 
The basis for this discussion was the Commission’s report on the topic. The Council concluded 
that whilst supply remains limited, the world demand for energy would increase. The Council 
pleaded that in order to benefit from a broad range of energy sources, Europe had to diversify 
its sources of energy. Furthermore, because it was seen as relevant for the security of the supply, 
the council took in account the view of the challenges of global warming with special attention 
to low emission energy production and renewable energy sources. Finally, the Council 
                                               
14 Romanova, Tatiana, “Is Russian Energy Policy towards the EU only about Geopolitics? The Case of the Third 
Liberalisation Package,” Geopolitics 21:4 (2016): 857-879. 
15 Bachtler, John and Mendez, Carlos, EU Cohesion Policy and European Integration: The dynamics of EU 
Budget and regional policy reform (London: Routledge, 2016), 212. 
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announced that the Commission would publish a Green Paper on a European Energy Policy in 
the upcoming spring.16  
The paper was already released in the beginning of March 2006. It was written in order 
to develop a coherent European policy combining competitiveness, sustainability and security 
of energy supply. The Commission wanted to deliver a common European response to the new 
energy landscape of the 21st century. In their view, this new landscape would consist of an 
increasing import dependency, volatile energy prices, a strong growing global energy demand 
and global warming. The fundamental question the Commission had to answer was whether or 
not there was agreement amongst its member states on the need to develop a common European 
Energy Strategy and whether or not sustainability, competitiveness and security should be the 
core principles of that strategy. The six key areas of challenges they addressed are as follows: 
competitiveness and an internal energy market, diversification of the energy mix, solidarity, 
innovation and technology, sustainable development and a common external policy. The 
Commission pushed for an external policy as they believed it would enable Europe to “play a 
more effective international role in tackling common problems with energy partners 
worldwide.”17 Furthermore, they were convinced that an external energy policy would show 
member states’ commitment to common solutions to shared problems and that it would be a 
break from the past. They mention the following benefits: securing and diversifying energy 
supplies, energy partnerships with produces, transit countries and other international actors, 
reacting effectively to external crisis situations, integrating energy into other policies with an 
external dimension and finally to have energy as a tool to promote development.   
These benefits for energy partnerships are worth a more detailed explanation. The EU 
and its energy partners are interdependent, which is reflected at specific EU energy dialogues 
with several producer and transit countries at bilateral and regional level. In the report, the 
Commission especially mention that the initiative of an external energy policy would be 
particularly desired in regard with the EU’s most important energy supplier, Russia. They 
mention Russia as “an essential and equal partner”18 in this relationship. With the 
implementation of a common policy, the Commission wanted to mark a step change in this 
energy partnership at both community and national level. The Commission wanted to offer 
                                               
16 “Interim report on the follow up to the informal meeting of Heads of State and Government at Hampton 
Court,” 7 December 2005, accessed 1 December 2019, Commission of the European Communities, 2-7. 
17 “Green Paper: A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy,” 8 March 2006, accessed 1 
December 2019, Commission of the European Communities, 14. 
18 Idem, 15.  
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predictability and security for both parties, fair and reciprocal access to markets and 
infrastructure. That would include access to pipelines for third parties.19  
The idea of developing a pan-European Energy Community is also discussed. For some 
time, the EU had been engaged in including its neighbours and bringing them closer to the EU’s 
internal market by widening the EU energy market. The Commission proposed to create a 
common regulatory space around Europe in order to develop common trade, environmental and 
transit rules, market harmonization and integration. This ‘space’ would bring both the EU and 
its neighbours a transparent and predictable market to stimulate growth and investment as well 
as security of supply.20  
The Commission concluded that sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply 
should become the main objectives of the European Energy Policy. In order to meet these 
objectives, they made six concrete proposals: 
1. The EU needs to complete the internal gas and electricity markets 
2. The EU needs to ensure that its internal energy market guarantees security of supply 
   and solidarity between member states 
3. The EU needs a debate on the different energy sources 
4. The EU needs to deal with climate change 
5. The EU needs a strategic energy technology plan 
6. The EU needs a common external energy policy 
The Commission concluded that a common external energy policy can be achieved by: 
identifying European priorities for the construction of new infrastructure for the security of EU 
energy supplies, developing a pan- European Energy Community, creating a new energy 
partnership with Russia, creating a new Community mechanism to enable rapid and coordinated 
reaction to emergency external energy supply situation impacting EU supplies, deepening 
energy relations with major producers and consumers and creating an international agreement 
on energy efficiency.21  
In January 2007, the Commission presented its first common European Energy Policy. 
The document is an elaboration of the Strategy the Commission presented one year earlier, 
there is little new in it. The pillars of this policy are sustainability, security of supply and 
competitiveness. In 2007, the EU was for 50% depended on energy import and they expected 
                                               
19 “Green Paper: A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy,” 8 March 2006, accessed 1 
December 2019, Commission of the European Communities, 15. 
20 Idem, 16.   
21 Idem, 17-20. 
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an increase to 65% in 2030. In the introduction of the policy, the Commission mention again 
that dependence carries political and economic risks. Furthermore, they state that several 
member states are largely or completely dependent on one single gas supplier and that in an 
event of an energy crisis the mechanisms to ensure solidarity between member states are not 
yet in place. The proposed action plan of the Commission focused on the creation of an internal 
market, solidarity between member states and of course on the security of supply. They were 
convinced that an internal energy market would increase the interdependence of member states 
in their energy supply. The Commission stresses that the EU has effective energy relationship 
with gas suppliers such as the European Economic Area (EEA) and Norway, as well as with 
Russia and Algeria. They mention explicitly that they are confident that these relationships will 
strengthen in the future. However, that did not take away their desire to diversity regarding the 
source, supplier, transport route and transport method. They made three proposals to promote 
energy security. At first, they wanted to take measurements to assist member states that are 
(mostly) dependent on one supplier to diversify their sources. Secondly, they wanted to develop 
projects to get gas from new regions, set up new gas hubs in Central Europe and Baltic countries 
and facilitate with the construction of new liquid natural gas terminals. Finally, they wanted to 
make new investments in storage and pipeline capacity of strategic gas stocks.22   
The years prior to the creation of the document, the drastically EU enlarged. In 2004, 
the EU expanded from 15 member states to 25. Most of these new member states (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia) were former Comecon 
states. When Bulgaria and Romania also entered the EU in 2007, the European family was 
almost complete. 5 years later, Croatia would be the final country to enter the EU up to date. 
Europe’s Eastern enlargements of 2004-2007 caused a much greater variety of energy systems, 
naturally making the matter more complex.    
Until 2009, a European Energy Policy and related issues were still under the exclusive 
authority of individual member states as the matter was solely addressed in these EU documents 
as the level of secondary legislation. The new Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), 
which is part of the Lisbon Treaty (1 December 2009) was probably the most important change 
in the process of shaping a common policy. A framework for energy cooperation and a new 
legal foundation for adopting measures through legislative acts was created in the third part of 
the TFEU, which formally constitutes the EU energy policy of primary legislation. The Lisbon 
Treaty was the first official contract to refer explicitly to energy policy together with solidarity 
                                               
22 “An Energy Policy for Europe,” 10 January 2007, accessed 4 December 2019, Commission of the European 
Communities, 3-19.  
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with specific goals such as security, functioning of the internal energy market, energy efficiency 
and interconnectedness of energy networks. What is important to point out, is that since the 
Lisbon Treaty, energy related issues are now included among the shared powers of the EU and 
its member states. In practicality this means that member states lost their exclusive control over 
this strategic area.23   
Several gas disputes between Russia and transit country Ukraine resulted in temporary 
disruptions of gas supplies and left several EU countries with severe shortages. This had a direct 
impact on EU citizens, in particular Europe’s new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. 
In 2008, the dispute started when Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz had to pay its debts for 
previous gas supplies in order to prevent the Russian company Gazprom from no longer 
delivering new supplies. After a series of failed negotiations in 2008, Russia decided to cut off 
gas supplies to Ukraine on the 1st of January 2009. Two weeks later, on January 18th, Ukrainian 
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and Russian Prime Minister Putin met to resolve the 
dispute.24 A similar dispute took place back in 2006, impacting 13 European (not all were EU 
member states) countries. These countries saw a drop in the supply of gas between 30% 
(Slovakia, Slovenia) and 100% (Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).25   
Policy makers called these disputes a ‘stark wakeup call’ and it became evident that the 
approach for the energy supply of the EU needed to be revised. Within Europe’s political 
debate, ‘energy security’ began to gain more prominence. In the meantime, the EU tried to 
harmonize and integrate its energy governance. The difficulty for the EU was that it became 
evident that ‘energy security’ was defined, perceived and act upon very differently amongst its 
member states, which created a very splintered policy landscape. The wake of the Crimean 
annexation in March 2014 turned out to be a great push for the EU into dealing with this 
problem.26 
Following the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, energy security 
became the number one topic in the EU. The EU’s energy security had been endangered as 
consequence of the EU’s political, economic and individual sanctions against Russia, even 
though the sanctions were not directly targeted to the Russian energy industry. The EU feared 
(and is still afraid of) a partial reduction or maybe even complete cut-off of the energy material 
                                               
23 Tichy, Lukas, EU-Russia Energy Relations: A Discursive Approach (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland: 
2019), 26-27. 
24 Turksen, Umut, EU Energy Relations with Russia (London: Routledge, 2018), 2. 
25 Editors, “Ukraine ‘stealing Europe’s gas’,” BBC News, 2 January 2006, accessed 7 December 2019, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4574630.stm 
26 Szulecki, Kacper, Energy Security in Europe: Divergent Perceptions and Policy Challenges (Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018), 2.   
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supply.27 In response to those concerns, the European Commission released its Energy Security 
Strategy in May 2014. The strategy “aims to ensure a stable and abundant supply of energy for 
European citizens and the economy.”28  
The opening statement from the ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ by the European 
Commission captures the importance of energy in the current European society: “The European 
Union's prosperity and security hinges on a stable and abundant supply of energy. […] For most 
citizens, energy is available "on tap", it is ubiquitous and un-intrusive. This has a major 
influence on the factors that affect national decisions on energy policy, with security of supply 
not being on par with other considerations.”29 
This strategy was published in May 2014, just two months after the Russian annexation 
of the Crimean Peninsula. It is written in an ‘unprecedentedly geopolitical tone’ and was one 
of the first signs of the EU’s changing climate in its energy policy.30 In this report, the 
Commission mostly stresses the need for cooperation and solidarity amongst EU member states. 
Furthermore, they note that energy security issues are too often addressed only at a national 
level without taking fully into account the interdependence of member states. A more collective 
approach through a functioning internal market and greater cooperation at regional and 
European levels are presented as the key to improved energy security.31 
This need for a collective approach became the core of the energy policy of the former 
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk (who became President of the European Council at the end 
of 2014) when he proposed an Energy Union. The idea of this Union was later taken up and re-
shaped by the new European Commission under the watchful eye of Jean-Claude Juncker. In 
February 2015, the Strategy for the Energy Union was adopted. This was a major step towards 
a unified energy policy. The strategy had the same pillars of energy security, sustainability and 
competitiveness. Energy resilience was the central point of the strategy. Key to enhance energy 
resilience, was according to the Commission to reduce the overall dependence of EU economies 
on imported hydrocarbons.32  
                                               
27 Tichy, Lukas, EU-Russia Energy Relations: A Discursive Approach (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 
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28 “European security strategy,” European Commission, accessed 30 November 2019, 
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29 “European Energy Security Strategy,” 28 May 2014, accessed 12 August 2019, European Commission, 2. 
30 Szulecki, Kacper, Energy Security in Europe: Divergent Perceptions and Policy Challenges (Cham: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018), 2.  
31 “European Energy Security Strategy,” 28 May 2014, accessed 12 August 2019, European Commission, 2-20. 
32 “Speech by Commissioner Miguel Arias Canete a the 4th EU Energy Summit: International geopolitical 
uncertainties: brakes or accelerators for the EU energy transition?” European Commission, accessed 28 May 
2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_18_3242 
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However, the Commission wanted to further strengthen the EU influence in the external 
dimension of energy policy and therefore they assumed the mandate to oversee all future 
negotiations over new gas pipeline projects and also assumed a much greater engagement in 
the creation of intergovernmental treaties. At the same time, the EU recognized the importance 
of the external dimension of the Energy Union and recommended a greater involvement in the 
area of energy diplomacy. Half a year later, July 2015, the EU Energy Diplomacy Action Plan 
was adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council.33   
Although the Commission is trying hard to pursue a common energy policy, all 27 
member states still have their own energy policies. The reason that they have their own policies, 
existing parallel with the slowly forming energy policy of the EU is the result of political and 
structural obstacles within the EU for having one common energy policy. To grasp the difficulty 
of creating a common energy policy, it is important to understand that member states are not 
really eager to give up their energy related sovereignty. Lukas Tichy, author of the book ‘EU- 
Russia Energy Relations’, explains that there are at least four reasons why member states 
protect their sovereignty so vividly. The first reason he gives is that countries are not willing to 
give up national security and energy policy is always being considered as a component of 
national security. The second reason is that a disunited attitude amongst member states plays a 
significant role in the negotiations with major energy suppliers. This attitude stems from the 
great variety of aims and approaches regarding economy, energy and foreign and security 
policy amongst the member states. As third reason, Tichy explains that key factors preventing 
a unified policy are the different structures of national energy sectors and the related 
requirements for energy resource composition. The final reason is that member states have 
expressed their concerns that if overly ambitious targets were set, their economies would lose 
competitiveness.34  
 Traditionally, energy policy is in many countries an element of economic their policy. 
For example, the Foreign Office in Germany is not involved in energy policy decision making. 
However, in France energy policy is differently organized. Current President Emmanuel 
Macron (and his predecessors) have a major say in any energy related policies. The EU is 
divided on the approach of energy policies and maybe they are simply not ready for a common 
                                               
33 Tichy, Lukas, EU-Russia Energy Relations: A Discursive Approach (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland: 
2019), 27. 
34 Idem, 28. 
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energy policy. Therefore, perhaps it is better to conclude that the EU is still in the process of 
formulating a coherent energy policy, rather than having a consolidated policy at the moment.35 
 
The Nord Stream pipeline and German- Polish relations  
 
The difficulty with the formation of a common European energy policy can be illustrated by 
the issue of the Nord Stream pipeline. The project created friction between several member 
states and has ignited heated debates within the EU. As soon as the project started, it attracted 
criticism. A 2016 policy paper from the Environmental Studies and Policy Research Institute 
ESPRi (a think-tank accredited by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher dedication) shows 
the hamper of the development of a common energy policy by discrepancies between European 
member states, in particular Germany and Poland, about the articulation and understanding of 
energy security. Both states are prominent in Europe’s energy debate. They often advocate for 
diverging interpretations and policy solutions, even though they have to cope with similar 
energy security challenges. They have opposing views on many issues such as the use of nuclear 
power stations and renewables but in the case of gas pipelines and electricity interconnectors, 
actions by one country are seen as direct threat by the other. Their biggest twist point is energy 
dependence on Russia. The construction of the Nord Stream pipeline (in use since 2011) is 
without doubt the most controversial energy issue in the German-Polish relations. The Nord 
Stream pipeline allows direct natural gas deliveries from Russia to Germany bypassing Poland, 
one of the traditional transit countries. In Poland, the project is received overwhelmingly 
negative because it is viewed as politically motivated and a threat for the energy security in 
Poland. Poland’s former Minister of Defense, Radoslaw Sikorski, even linked the pipeline 
project with the Molotov- Ribbentrop pact (the pact between Hitler and Stalin in which they 
agreed to invade and divide Poland in 1939). The most important threats that Poland directly 
linked to the pipeline were economic in nature, followed by political risks. Poland lost its 
income from the transit fees they charged Russia and it was argued that Russia would have the 
possibility to interrupt gas deliveries to Poland without harming Germany and other Western 
consumer countries.36  
Germany and Austria have emerged as main advocates of the project and France and 
the Netherlands appear amenable to it due to involvement of domestic corporate interests. In 
                                               
35 Schaffer, Brenda, Energy Politics (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 129.  
36 “Towards a common EU energy policy? Debates on energy security in Poland and Germany,” February 2016, 
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the Bundestag, the German parliament, was only a minor discussion about Nord Stream. The 
main argument the supporters put forward was that the project follows the commercial logic by 
linking supplier and consumer with competitively priced gas. Furthermore, they advocated that 
it will meet the further demand that is created by the closure of nuclear power plants in Germany 
and the need to switch energy consumption from the more polluting coals and oil to gas.37 
German media reports however were more critical as they highlighted the environmental risks, 
the damage of the relationship with fellow member states and an increasing dependence on 
Russia.38 This was also the most important argument of the opponents of the project. Poland, 
the Baltic States (the other transit countries bypassed by North Stream), Romania and Slovakia 
argued that Nord Stream would consolidate Gazproms position in the EU energy market and 
its strategic leverage of Moscow. Their stance can be explained by a number of factors, 
including strategic reasons such as the loss of their strategic importance, but also the intention 
to diversify energy imports and concerns about east-west energy trade.39      
Struck between these opposing views, EU institutions have taken different stances 
towards Nord Stream. At first, the Commission opposed to the project as well and they 
requested a mandate from the Council of the EU (all heads of states of each EU member state) 
to negotiate an agreement with Russia concerning the operation of the pipeline, arguing it was 
necessary to define a legal framework. Their request was nothing more than a response to the 
pressure of opposing member states, but the Legal Service of the Council concluded that there 
was no legal rationale for an EU-Russia agreement concerning the project. Besides, the EU 
energy market had been built around the principles of liberalization and competition and any 
political attempts to block new projects like Nord Stream would counter this logic.40  
So, despite fierce protests from the opponents, the construction of the 1,224 kilometer 
long offshore pipeline began in April 2010. The pipeline was built by Nord Stream AG, an 
international consortium consisting of Russian state company Gazprom, the German based 
Wintershall Dea, PEG Infrastruktur (now part of E.ON energy company), Dutch gas 
transportation company Nederlandse Gasunie and the French gas distribution company ENGIE. 
The first gas came through the pipeline mid-November 2011.41  
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Similar tensions arose again in 2016 when plans were made to expand the pipeline. Germany 
kept stressing that the pipeline was an economic project, and not political. Furthermore, they 
stated that the position of Gazprom on the European domestic market depends in the first place 
on the competitiveness of Russian gas deliveries in competition with other suppliers. Poland 
demanded that the pipeline had to be constructed on land across Polish territory but soon it was 
countered with the argument that the consortium of Nord Stream is free to make its own 
commercial decisions. Despite Polish anti-trust proceedings, construction of the Nord Steam 2 
started in May 2018. The project has made it clear that in relation to Russian energy supplies, 
German and Polish perceptions of energy security are as contrary as ever.42   
 
The legal framework for EU-Russian energy relations  
 
To enhance certainty and uphold the interests of trade partners, all inter-state trade relations 
must be put on a legal footing. Since the 1990’s, several multilateral and bilateral legal 
instruments are designed to enhance the security of energy supplies from Russia to the EU. 
Some of these regimes can provide a strong basis for the EU and Russia to cooperate in the 
energy sector. However, a comprehensive and effective legal energy framework between 
Russia and the EU is currently nearly non-existent. It is difficult for the 27 EU member states 
to reach agreement and find compromises, specifically between the ‘old’ Western states and 
the ‘new’ Central and Eastern states of which there is a considerable diverge of interests.43  
 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement   
The first legal document for relations between the EU and Russia is the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), singed in 1994. The agreement provides a bilateral legal basis 
for trade and it regulates the cultural, economic and political relations between Russia and the 
EU. When the agreement was signed, trade was largely concentrated in mineral and energy 
sectors.  The primary objective of the agreement was to create an overall framework for political 
dialogue with the aim to have free trade between Russia and the EU and to gradually integrate 
Russia to market economy. Explicitly dedicated to energy is Article 65. The Article refers to a 
number of energy related issues, stating that the quality and security of energy supply should 
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be improved by cooperation. On the 1st of December 1997, the PCA came into force for a period 
of 10 years. To avoid a legal vacuum and uncertainty, the agreement was automatically 
prolonged with mutual agreement. Currently, negotiations for a new PCA are ongoing but it is 
unexpected that there these initiatives will bring any tangible results soon.44  
 
Energy Charter Treaty   
When the Cold War ended, Europe was divided between the West which was rich in money but 
energy poor and the East which was poor in money but energy rich. International law was not 
clear about the nature of rights and obligations regarding the transit of energy materials from 
Eastern to Western Europe. In 1991, the European Energy Charter was signed out of the need 
of combining the Western concerns and interests regarding the security of energy supplies with 
the Eastern energy assets. Increasing interdependence between West and East and providing 
more diverse energy routes and sources were the main aims of the Charter. The Charter was not 
legally binding, but it provided a political direction for the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) of 
1994. This binding multilateral legal instrument came into force 1998 and it is the only one in 
its kind to deal cooperation in the energy sector that includes both private parties and 
governments. The basic elements of the ECT are: freedom of energy transit, trade in energy, 
energy products and related equipment based on WTO rules, international dispute settlement, 
improved legal transparency and investment protection.45  
 
EU- Russia Energy Dialogue 
The formal Energy Dialogue was established on 30 October 2000 during the sixth EU- Russia 
Summit. The European Commission and the Russian Ministry of Energy established the EU- 
Russia energy partnership because both considered the energy sector as too important for one 
section of the PCA to deal with. In short, the Dialogue “provides the overall structure for energy 
cooperation between the EU and Russia going forward.”46 De dialogue aims on integration of 
EU and Russian energy markets, reforming the Russian energy industry and to make sure that 
the existing rules of the European energy market could be incorporated in Russia. Simply put, 
like the other treaties and charters, this dialogue wants to improve European energy security by 
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creating a closer relationship between Russia and the EU. They meet twice a year and are 
supported by thematic groups. These groups bring together Russian and EU experts and was 
established to exchange views on EU’s and Russia’s strategies, policies and forecasts in energy. 
By 2030, they want to bring coherence to their respective energy forecasts and scenarios. In 
addition, round tables are occasionally organized to discuss various issues. The Dialogue 
annually publishes their practical results as ‘Progress Reports.’ Some examples of tangible 
achievements that strengthen the energy security supply from Russia are the creation of the EU- 
Russia Technology Centre and the Permanent Partnership Council consisting of the Russian 
Minister Responsible for Energy, the EU Energy Commissioner and the Minister Responsible 
for Energy (from both the current EU Presidency as the next Presidency). In addition, to deal 
with and solve trade problems before they turn into a conflict a Memorandum on Early Warning 
Mechanisms was signed. The importance of the dialogue however should not be overstated as 
it effectiveness is limited due to its non-binding nature. Nevertheless, the ongoing dialogue can 
prepare the basis for discussions on the introduction of a legally binding measures for EU- 
Russia energy relations in the future.47  
 
There are more regimes that foster solidarity and that (try to) contribute to the security of the 
EU’s energy supply, for example the Energy Community (Encom). Encom is established to 
extend the EU’s energy community law to the South-East Europe, based on a legally binding 
energy trade framework. The establishment itself was already an achievement, because it was 
just 10 years after the Balkan conflict. Because Russia is not part of Encom, they cannot offer 
a platform for the energy trade with Russia or solve disputes arising therein, it is not worth to 
discuss the matter further.48  
 
World Trade Organization 
The final regime worth mentioning, is not a specific EU-Russian agreement but it is the 
intergovernmental World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO is the world largest economic 
organization and regulates international trade between nations. The WTO enjoys a high degree 
of legitimacy that can be attributed to the thickening of legality and effective dispute settlement. 
Although energy trade is not addressed as distinctive sector, it is argued that trade in energy 
goods and services are forms of trade and therefore the fundamental principles of the WTO are 
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applicable. WTO is the only international trade organization that has an adjudication regime 
with an automatic and compulsory jurisdiction, even though the WTO rules on energy are only 
a fraction of international legal instruments pertaining to energy. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that in the recent years, the topic of energy trade has dominated the WTO negotiation 
agenda. The explanation therefore can be found in the increase in the number of energy 
exporting countries which are part of WTO. Multilateral trade negotiations have inevitably 
included energy policies because of its direct impact on development, environment and climate 
change. In August 2012, Russia became the 156th member of WTO after nearly two decades of 
accession negotiations. Russia was able to become a WTO member without the so called 
‘WTO-plus commitments’ meaning that Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy exporter, has 
no trade barriers and therefore can apply export taxes when exporting its energy products. 
What becomes clear is that regarding energy trade, any future initiatives within the 
WTO legal framework should recognize both the structural factors and the composition that are 
unique to the energy sector. Umut Turksen, author of the book EU-Russian energy relations, 
mentions that because of the uniqueness of the energy sector, some commentators opine that 
the WTO should allow a flexible application of its rules to the energy sector. The reason they 
would be in favor of this special treatment is that they believe that “energy resources typically 
belong to a State and that many energy exporting countries have structured their energy sectors 
around state owned enterprises.”49 Turksen acknowledges that this approach could be a 
“pragmatic response” for the current situation but he considers it unlikely that it would provide 





The origin of European energy 
 
The range of available energy sources in the EU, the so called “energy mix”, is roughly 
composed of crude oil, natural gas, solid fossil fuels51, renewable energy and nuclear energy. 
Oil, gas and solid fuels account for about 72% of the total primary energy consumption. 
Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU, shows that 45% of all energy is produced within the 
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EU itself, while 55% of Europe’s energy is imported. The most recent data available in Eurostat 
is from 2017 and therefore, all data used in this chapter is from 2017.52  
Nuclear energy and renewable energy are mostly produced by the EU itself, while crude 
oil, natural gas and solid fuels are mostly imported. In all three sectors, Russia is the main 
supplier to the EU. Here is an overview of Europe’s biggest energy suppliers divided by natural 










These numbers give a general overview of the 
European energy import, however there are 
clear dependence patterns among different EU 
member states. Therefore, the three tables on 
the next pages show an overview EU energy 
imports divided per each member state. The 
table features their three main suppliers and is 
arranged according to the extent to which each 
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54 “From where do we import energy and how dependent are we?”  Eurostat, accessed 27 January 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html 
EU Member State Nr. 1 % Nr . 2 % Nr. 3 %
Slovakia Russia 74.0 Czech Republic 8.1 Austria 7.3
Finland Russia 71.9 Sweden 11.3 Norway 8.0
Poland Russia 68.5 Germany 5.3 Saudi Arabia 5.2
Lithuania Russia 61.8 Kazakhstan 21.3 Saudi Arabia 5.3
Bulgaria Russia 50.2 Iraq 16.2 Kazakhstan 9.5
Hungary Russia 42.7 Iraq 19.9 Slovakia 11.8
Romania Russia 40.9 Kazakhstan 28.2 Azeraijan 7.5
Czech Republic Russia 35.2 Azerbaijan 20.8 Germany 12.1
Belgium Russia 33.3 Netherlands 19.6 Saudi Arabia 13.0
Germany Russia 31.4 Netherlands 14.8 Norway 8.1
Sweden Russia 31.2 Norway 23.6 Denmark 13.9
Netherlands Russia 30.1 Belgium 11.1 UK 9.8
Portugal Russia 22.1 Azerbaijan 10.3 Spain 10.0
France Russia 14.6 Saudi Arabia 9.9 Kazakhstan 9.2
Estonia Lithuania 47.7 Russia 29.8 Finland 13.6
Latvia Lithuania 42.6 Russia 24.1 Finland 16.0
Denmark Norway 41.3 Russia 21.8 Sweden 8.9
Greece Iraq 30.3 Russia 19.6 Iran 13.0
UK Norway 28.9 Russia 11.5 Netherlands 9.0
Italy Azerbaijan 14.6 Iran 11.2 Russia 11.1
Luxembourg Belgium 65.5 Germany 21.0 France 9.4
Ireland UK 49.0 Norway 21.4 US 5.5
Slovenia Italy 42.7 Austria 11.0 US 7.8
Cyprus Greece 35.1 Israel 26.4 France 17.9
Austria Germany 30.3 Kazakhstan 17.0 Iraq 7.7
Malta Cameroon 23.3 UK 23.3 Italy 19.4
Croatia Italy 17.7 Iraq 13.9 Azarbaijan 12.1
Spain Mexico 10.9 Nigeria 10.6 Saudi Arabia 9.5
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55 “From where do we import energy and how dependent are we?”  Eurostat, accessed 27 January 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html 
EU Member State Nr. 1 % Nr. 2 % Nr. 3 %
Finland Russia 100.0 n/a n/a
Estonia Russia 100.0 n/a n/a
Latvia Russia 100.0 n/a n/a
Bulgaria Russia 100.0 n/a n/a
Czech Republic Russia 99.2 n/a n/a
Romania Russia 98.9 Bulgaria 1.1 n/a
Hungary Russia 95.0 n/a n/a
Slovakia Russia 84.6 n/a n/a
Germany Russia 52.3 Norway 9.2 n/a
Poland Russia 65.6 Germany 22.7 Qatar 9.8
Greece Russia 58.2 Algeria 25.1 Turkey 12.3
Lithuania Russia 53.7 Norway 35.3 US 7.2
Italy Russia 47.5 Algeria 28.0 Qatar 9.7
Luxumbourg Norway 63.9 Russia 25.3 Algeria 0.1
Slovenia Austria 75.0 Russia 23.0 n/a
France Norway 41.8 Russia 18.7 Netherlands 11.3
Netherlands Norway 48.6 Russia 17.3 UK 15.3
Ireland UK 100.0 n/a n/a
Denmark Norway 80.4 Germany 19.6 n/a
UK Norway 76.1 Qatar 12.2 Belgium 5.6
Sweden Denmark 70.6 Norway 18.4 Netherlands 5.5
Malta Trinidad 65.3 Equitorial Guinea 20.9 US 8.0
Croatia Hungary 52.8 Austria 34.6 Slovenia 12.5
Spain Algeria 48.3 Nigeria 12.7 Peru 10.1
Belgium Netherlands 43.3 Norway 28.7 UK 14.8
Portugal Nigeria 33.9 Algeria 33.8 Qatar 9.3
Austria No data No data No data
Cyprus No data No data No data
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56 “From where do we import energy and how dependent are we?”  Eurostat, accessed 27 January 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html 
EU Member State Nr. 1 % Nr. 2 % Nr. 3 %
Estonia Russia 100.0 n/a n/a
Latvia Russia 98.2 Lithuania 1.4 Estonia 0.3
Lithuania Russia 94.4 Ukraine 3.4 Denmark 1.8
Greece Russia 90.0 US 8.8 Mozambique 1.2
Bulgaria Russia 81.7 Ukraine 10.7 South Africa 6.9
Croatia Russia 77.3 Colombia 10.7 Czech Republic 5.6
Cyprus Russia 66.7 Greece 33.3 n/a
Poland Russia 64.7 Australia 12.9 US 5.9
Finland Russia 63.4 Canada 15.8 US 11.3
Denmakr Russia 57.6 South Africa 19.8 Colombia 15.6
Romania Russia 44.1 Poland 42.8 South Africa 5.0
UK Russia 42.1 US 24.8 Australia 9.0
Germany Russia 36.1 US 17.1 Colombia 11.7
Italy Russia 34.6 Colombia 21.0 US 18.3
Netherlands Russia 33.5 US 19.2 Colombia 14.7
Slovakia Russia 27.2 Czech Republic 24.9 Poland 23.0
France Russia 26.0 Australia 25.7 US 15.9
Spain Russia 26.0 Colombia 23.6 Indonesia 22.0
Belgium Australia 29.2 Russia 27.7 US 16.2
Luxumbourg South Africa 80.6 Russia 6.1 n/a
Sweden Australia 35.7 US 18.4 Russia 17.8
Portugal Colombia 78.8 US 12.9 Russia 5.2
Slovenia Indonesia 89.7 Romania 4.8 Czech Republic 2.4
Ireland Colombia 87.1 UK 3.1 Poland 1.2
Czech Republic Poland 80.9 Germany 5.4 Canada 4.2
Austria Poland 48.9 Czech Republic 13.6 US 11.4
Hungary US 38.6 Czech Republic 23.2 Australia 12.1
Malta No data 
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Understanding dependency  
 
What stands out in these figures is that the number of suppliers, and the extent of dependence 
of each member state, varies heavenly between the three different energy types. To determine 
to what extent the EU is dependent on energy import, Eurostat has developed an energy 
dependency rate. The rate shows to which extent the economies of all EU member states rely 
upon energy imports to meet their needs. The rate is measured by the share of net imports 
(imports minus exports) in gross inland energy consumption. The total energy dependency rate 
of the EU in 2017 was 55%, so slightly more than half of the energy needs were imported. Here 
follows an overview of the energy dependency rate of each member state.57 
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Figure 4: 2017 Energy dependency rate %
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Again, there are notable differences amongst member states. It is not surprisingly that small 
countries like Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg are very dependent on external energy suppliers. 
On the other side of the spectrum, Romania, Denmark and Estonia are hardly dependent on 
external suppliers. The real question is not how dependent are member states, but whether or 
not dependency is a problem. In order to answer that question, it is useful to combine the total 
dependency rate of each member state with the extent to which they depend on their main 
suppliers. When a high proportion of energy imports are concentrated among relatively few 
external partners, the stability of the EU’s energy supply could possibly be threatened. In short: 
energy security depends not only on a low dependency rate, but also on the number of external 
suppliers. Concentrating on external suppliers, few major suppliers continue to dominate the 
import picture. The main challenge for the EU seems to concern the gas sector, since the oil 
and solid fuel markets have a broader variety of suppliers and multiple options for 
transportation. As seen in the tables about energy imports, the current risk of security of energy 
supply is the highest in the Visegrad countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic) and in the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). To prevent the EU from 
becoming too dependent on a small pool of suppliers, European energy policy is focused on 
diversifying sources and suppliers of energy. A clear example of the EUs diversifying strategies 
are the measurements to diversify gas supply. This includes constructing new routes in order to 
decrease the dependence of EU countries on single suppliers of natural gas and other energy 
resources and to ensure the EU internal market is less sensitive to shocks in gas supply. A key 
project in diversification efforts of the EU is the Southern Gas Corridor. Already working on 
Northern and Eastern Gas Corridors, the remaining priority for the EU is to bring gas from the 
Caspian region directly to the EU.58 Additionally, the EU is strengthening the reverse flow 
capacities (making gas pipelines bidirectional) as well as expanding the LNG import capacity 
to contribute to security of energy supply so that member states are able to respond more 
efficiently to temporary shortages or surpluses on the regional gas markets.59  
These concerns and measurements are not new, energy trade relations of the EU have 
always been mobile as they respond to developments in geopolitics, international energy 
markets and the international economy in general. A number of events that determined EU 
energy relations are conflicts in the Middle East, the oil crises during the 1970’s and the earlier 
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discussed gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine. A flurry of new initiatives concerning 
energy relations was the direct consequence of the 1973 oil crisis. Under the aegis of the 
Organization Economic and Cooperation Development (OECD), the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) was founded with substantial powers in can of an oil market disruption. One 
month later, the EU (then nine member states) agreed to a common energy policy. It took a very 
long time before the policy was actually developed, but the origin of today’s energy policy lies 
in the desire to increase the EU’s energy security and solve energy related problems together 
with all member states instead of individually.60 
 
Soviet legacy and Russia as main energy supplier of the EU 
 
The successive enlargements of the EU had a major influence on the development of external 
energy relations. The most significant influence for the current EU energy relations was the 
enlargement of 2004 when the Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Slovenia and Hungary became part of the EU. The energy infrastructure of these new member 
states had been part of the old Soviet infrastructure and their industrial endowment reflected 
the policy decisions that had been taken during Soviet times. These Soviet legacies have 
resulted in the fact that most of these new member states are nowadays still disproportionately 
dependent on Russia as energy supplier. They lack the infrastructure to import gas from other 
suppliers and therefore have no alternatives to Russian gas, that is mainly used for heating their 
houses. This higher degree of dependency has led to contrasting attitudes where Western 
European countries deal with Russia’s energy in a pragmatic way while Eastern European 
countries lobby at EU level to break away from Russia in an attempt to reduce their overreliance 
on Russian energy. “The Eastern vulnerability to disruptions in the flow of Russian gas is 
compounded by their mistrust of Russia as a geopolitical actor, which is grounded in a long 
history of Tsarist and Soviet domination.”61 Due to long-standing cooperation, several Western 
European states like Italy, Denmark, Germany and the Netherland have a more diversified 
number of suppliers and are better connected to the global gas market. Therefore, they have 
more trust in Russia as energy trade partner. The external energy policy posture of the EU is 
heavenly influenced by the import dependence of these Eastern member states on Russian oil 
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and gas. Particularly the complicated relationship between Russia and Ukraine has resulted in 
highly politicised gas relations.62   
 
Increase or decrease? 
 
To get a complete overview of the European dependence on Russian energy, it is important to 
focus on the longer-term developments in addition to the current state of affairs as was 
portraited in the previous chapter. How has the energy relationship between the EU and Russia 
developed during the past two decennia? Has the EU become more dependent on Russia or has 
dependence on Russian energy decreased over the recent years? In order to determine this, the 
dependence on Russian energy per sector since 2005 is compared in this chapter. This data 
provides a strong picture of the long-term trend of European energy dependence. A conscious 
decision has been made to measure the long-term dependence since 2005 since in 2004 
European energy landscape changed after ten new member states joined the EU. The 
measurement points have been every other year starting in 2005. The complete overview is 
enclosed in the appendix, but this chapter will review and explain the highlights per sector.  
 
Oil 
   
The five EU member states that are most dependent on Russia for their oil import were in 2017: 
Finland (importing 79.9% of their oil from Russia), Slovakia (74%), Poland (68.5%), Lithuania 
(61.8%) and Bulgaria (50.2%). In 2005, the numbers were slightly different. Back then, the five 
most dependent were Lithuania (94.4%), Slovakia (78.9%), Hungary (78.9%), Finland (72.2%) 
and Bulgaria (69.5%). It is obvious that during these 12 years, the oil import of these five 
member states from Russia has decreased. However, even though these states are highly 
dependent, their numbers do not say much about the total European dependence on oil import 
from Russia. Finland, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Bulgaria together make up for 10.4% of 
the total oil import.  
 To draw conclusions about the overall EU dependence on Russian oil import, it is more 
valuable to look at the five member states that import the most oil. In 2017 that were: France 
(importing 14.6% of their oil from Russia), Germany (31.4%), Italy (11.1%), the Netherlands 
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(30.2%) and Spain (5.7%). Together, their oil import makes up 57% of the total EU import. 
The next figure shows the five main oil importers and the percentage of their oil they import 
from Russia. Although there have been some shifts at individual country level, it is clearly 
visible that the total percentage of imported oil has only slightly increased. Between 2005 and 
2017, the overall EU dependence on Russian oil increased by the small number of 1.2% while 
the overall absolute oil import in barrels decreased. 
 
Figure 5.1: European oil import from Russia in percentages 2005-201763 
 
 
Figure 5.2: European oil import in absolute numbers and percentage of oil import from Russia 
2005-201764 
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During 2005, there were eight EU member states which imported 100% of their natural gas 
from Russia. These member states were Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia. Other former Comecon states such as Czech Republic (importing 76.1% 
of their gas from Russia), Hungary (73.4%), Poland (66%), and Slovenia (59.8%) all have a 
high percentage of gas import from Russia in common. In 2017, still five of these member states 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Slovakia) were importing 100% of their gas from 
Russia. Romania found a new supplier in Bulgaria but nonetheless imported 98.9% from 
Russia, while Lithuania managed to diversify its suppliers and reduced Russian import to 
53.7%. Oher suppliers of Lithuania were Norway, the United States and Nigeria. The most 
spectacular change comes from Croatia which completely stopped importing gas from Russia. 
The high degree of dependence on Russian gas of former Comecon states is understandable as 
many of them still use the old Soviet pipeline networks. In addition, it is more difficult to find 
new gas suppliers as the costs to build new pipeline networks are extremely high. Together, 
these eight member states import 3.8% of the total EU gas import during 2017.  
 The five biggest gas importers of the EU are France (import 18.7% of their gas from 
Russia), Germany (52.3%), Italy (47.5%), the Netherlands (17.3%) and the United Kingdom 
(0.0%). The imported together a significant 70.9% of the total EU gas import during 2017. Like 
the oil import, the total gas import from Russia between 2005 and 2017 went up with 1.2%. 
What is interesting, is that the course of the gas import is different from the course of the oil 
import. On the oil figure, it is clearly visible that after years of a slow increase, there was a dip 
between 2013 and 2015. However, the overall oil import has been stable over the entire period 
while the gas import decreased until 2009 and since then has gone up back to its level of 2005. 



















Of all energy imports, the percentage of solid fuel import from Russia increased the most with 
a total of 13.1%. The five member states that import most solid fuel are France (8.4% from 
Russia), Germany (28.7%), Italy (8.6%), the Netherlands (8.2%) and Spain (10.5%), importing 
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together 64% of the total solid fuel import. However, although the percentage of dependence 
has increased, the absolute import of solid fuels has decreased. This can be explained through 
the energy transition, the current trend of breaking away from polluting forms of energy. In the 
search for cleaner alternatives, energy that originates from wind or water gains popularity over 
traditional sources of energy like oil, and in particular, solid fuel.  
 
Figure 6.1: European solid fuels import from Russia in percentages 2005-201767 
 
 
Figure 6.2: European soil fuels import in absolute numbers and percentage of solid fuels import 
from Russia 2005-201768 
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Explanation for increasing Russian dependence  
 
Given the context of the EU’s energy sources diversification policies, reciprocal sanctions after 
2014 and the political tensions between Russia and the EU, the outcome of increasing 
dependence on Russian energy may come as a surprise. However, the sanctions have left the 
energy sector largely unscathed. In fact, the rise of Russian energy supplies to the EU in this 
case has little to do with politics. This may seem quite contractionary given the earlier made 
statement that energy is linked with geopolitics. Along with that, there have been plenty of 
examples in which the political context has influenced EU’s energy relations with Russia. 
Having said that, the increase of EU dependence on Russian gas can be found in the EU’s 
economic recovery, lower prices of Russian gas and a decrease of gas production within the EU 
itself. In particular decisions to close domestic energy production like the nuclear power plants 
in Germany and the sudden decision of the Dutch government to close the gas tap by 2022. The 
loss of domestic production had to be compensated with more imported energy from outside of 
the EU. The reason the Dutch government made this drastic decision is because of the severe 
earthquakes caused by gas extraction and the unsafe situation that arose due to the collapse of 
houses as a result of these earthquakes.69 Finally, the increase of foreign gas demand is also 
boosted by the global energy transition. EU policies support member states in switching their 
energy resources from the highly polluting goal to gas as cleaner alternative. All these 
mentioned factors for the increase of Russian gas to the EU are mainly commercial and not so 
much political.70  
As concluded in the previous chapter, not all EU member states are evenly satisfied with 
this trend. In particular Eastern European member states have their reservations and are actively 
lobbying for a decrease of the European dependence on Russia. Unfortunately for them, Russian 
energy is gaining popularity despite their concerns and it is predicted that it will only increase 
further in the future.71 Concerning gas, the Russian option is simply more attractive than (for 
example) Norwegian gas because of economic reasons. The weaker ruble makes Russian gas 
more competitive. The biggest competition to Russian gas is LNG, but so far it has not been 
very successful. This is the result of delays in LNG projects, a higher demand of LNG in Asia 
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(mainly in China) and the higher prices of LNG compared to traditional transported natural gas. 
The LNG trade in EU began to increase in 2017, but unfortunately there is no access to the data 
of energy imports since then.72 
In 2016, when it became clear that gas extraction caused serious earthquakes and 
measurements had to be taken to prevent further damage, the Dutch government considered the 
possibility of importing more gas for Russia. Encouraged by Eastern EU member states, the 
Dutch House of Representatives had their objections and asked to government for more clarity 
about the Dutch gas relationship with Russia. As a respond to their questions, the Dutch 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, Minister of Economic Affairs, Henk Kamp and 
Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Coorperation, Lilliane Ploumen wrote a letter to 
the Dutch Parliament. They note: “Russian products are structurally cheaper than most 
alternatives and there is already a lot of infrastructure present to bring the gas to the closet 
market (Europe). Although the price difference between LNG and traditional gas imports via 
pipelines has sharply declined in recent years and that trend seems to continue, LNG is often 
still relatively expensive compared to alternatives on the European market, partly due to high 
demand of LNG from Asia. For the time being, it is often more attractive for parties on the gas 
market to transport gas via pipelines to northwest Europe.”73 This letter is explementary for the 
Western pragmatism concerning the energy relations with Russia. In addition, it is important to 
mention that with a regard on energy security, not only dependence on Russia can be a threat 
for the EU but also imports from unstable regions like Iraq or Libya poses risks. For that reason, 
some EU states prefer dependence on Russia over dependence on Libya. Because this thesis is 
focused on the energy relationship with Russia, the risks of dependence on other states will not 
be further elaborated.  
The energy relationship between Russia and the EU is mainly a strategic partnership. 
Even though Russia owns the resources that the EU needs and therefore the two partners are in 
unidentical situations, their relationship provides them the same benefits because Russia is not 
only a supplier of energy, it is also an economic partner. Mutual long-term benefits seek a 
balance in the interests and expectations of both sides. Essential in this case is that despite the 
usual media image, all relevant literature about EU- Russian energy relations agree that there 
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is an interdependence between the EU and Russia instead of a unilateral EU dependence. While 
the EU needs Russia for its energy resources, Russia seeks ways to secure this energy demand 
that the EU market presents.74 
Furthermore of importance, is that in addition to mutual dependence, the energy 
relations between the EU and Russia has been rendered more predictable due to the option of 
resulting long-standing commercial disputes. An early warning mechanism between Russia and 
the EU was established following the 2009 gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine. The system 
is an instrument aiming to ensure rapid communication and to prevent supply interruptions in 
electricity, gas or oil.75  
 
Main energy trends in the EU society 
 
A new European Commission, led by the German Ursula von der Leyen, was accepted by the 
European Parliament on 27 November 2019. They presented their plans for the future of the 
EU, with a special attention to their ambitious climate program. A quarter of the total EU budget 
is reserved for this so called “green deal.” The most important principle of the plan is to reduce 
emissions to the aspiring 0% by 2050. One of the measurements that will be taken to achieve 
this goal is the implementation of a climate law with mandatory measures for all EU member 
states.76 This naturally raises the question, what does that mean for energy consumption within 
the EU? Before that question can be answered, it is crucial to understand the current role of 
energy in the EU and the main trends of the recent years.   
During her first week in office, Von der Leyen stressed the importance of inclusiveness 
regarding her green deal. In doing so, she particularly aimed to reassure the highly sceptical 
Eastern EU member states Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The Commission’s main 
priority is to get everyone on board, meaning every member state fully supports their deal.  One 
of the concrete plans of the green deal is to completely transit to clean energy, meaning the 
elimination of the use of coals and the use of gas is only allowed if the CO2 emissions are being 
captured. The skepticism of the Eastern member states towards the ban of coal is not difficult 
to explain as in these countries, the economy, employment and energy supply are all still heavily 
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dependent on coal mining. Therefore, they are vehemently opposed to the aim of making the 
EU climate neutral by 2050.77  
 What is remarkable, is that despite the increase of Russian energy import, the EU overall 
energy consumption has actually decreased since 2005. In 2017, the primary energy use of the 
EU was 9% lower than in 2005. Overall, the share of non-renewable fuels has decreased, while 
over the same period the share of renewable fuels has significantly increased. The main trends 
per fuel type used by the EU: 
- Coal: the share of coal as primary energy consumption decreased from 18% in 2005 to 
14.4% in 2017. The absolute consumption of coal decreased since 2005 by 2.7% per 
year with an overall total of 17%. Coal is mostly used for electricity generation. The 
decline of the use of coal is due to a combination of national policies, energy market 
developments and electricity generation of renewable sources.78  
- Natural gas: the share of natural gas has hardly decreased, from 25% in 2005 to 24.4% 
in 2017. However, in absolute numbers the decrease was shaper as the absolute gas 
consumption decreased by 23% (2.9% per year). The side note to this trend is that since 
2014, the gas consumption increased again by 16.6% (5.2% per year). In the past, gas-
fired power plants ran continuously but various factors have affected their operations. 
Now they have reduced yearly operating hours by operating more often during peal-
load times. Other factors that contributed to the reduced use of gas are the rapid increase 
in the production of electricity from renewable sources, the stagnation of electricity 
demand following the economic crisis of 2008 and the low price of coal relative to gas 
combined with low CO2 prices in the EU emissions trading system. This having said, 
increasing coal prices and national policies such as carbon pricing for electricity 
production resulted in the fact that since 2015, gas fired power plants have regained 
their competitiveness compared with coal fired power plants.79  
- Oil: the oil share decreased from 33.9% in 2005 to 31.6% in 2017. The absolute 
consumption decreased by 15% (1.3% per year). Factors that have contributed to the 
decrease of the oil share in the primary energy consumption are the unprecedently high 
oil prices during some periods of time and the increasing use of biofuels in the transport 
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sector. Furthermore, EU regulations on CO2 emissions for cars and vans stimulated to 
the energy efficiency improvements on vehicles. But, similar as for the share of gas 
consumption, during 2014-2017 there was an increase in oil consumption. This trend is 
most like influenced by the recovery that followed after the economic recession of 
2008.80  
- Nuclear energy. As the EU does not import nuclear energy, this energy type is not 
discussed so far. Nonetheless, the share of nuclear energy in the EU energy consumption 
was 13.4% in 2017. Compared to 2005, when the overall share was 15%, there was a 
slight decrease. The absolute consumption decreased by 17% (1.7% per year). The 
explanation of this decrease can be found in the closing of several nuclear power plants 
in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear incident in 2011. Since then, the costs of nuclear 
energy have risen due to the extra investments regarding safety measures and 
maintenance of the power plants. In addition, it is notoriously difficult to dispose nuclear 
waste safely. As the aftermath of nuclear incidents always have a big influence on the 
public opinion, shifts in the public opinion also contributes to the decommission of 
nuclear power plants. These factors combined show why nuclear energy is not a very 
popular option for most EU member states.81  
- Renewable energy: the share of renewable energy is the only primary energy 
consumption of the EU that increased. In fact, between 2005 and 2017 it more than 
doubled, going from 7.2% to 14.8%. The absolute consumption increased by 78% (5.5% 
per year). This growth can be attributed to significant cost reduction in renewable 
energy technologies. The rapid increase is furthermore stimulated by national and 
European policies to promote the use of renewable energy such as feed-in tariffs and 
premiums, obligations for electricity producers and obligations for using renewables in 
transport fuel. In fact, all EU member states have renewable energy policies and support 
schemes in places to help favour their use. The uptake of renewable energy varies 
between member states and energy market sectors, such as electricity, transport, heating 
and cooling.82 
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Despite their declining share in the overall energy consumption of the EU, solid fuels continue 
to be the dominant energy source. But the trend is clear, the EU relies less on solid fuels and 
the uptake of renewable energy went faster than predicted. The overall reduction of the use of 
energy of the EU can generally be attributed to energy efficiency improvements, structural 
changes in the European economy and the economic recession of 2008, which lowered the 
overall demand for electricity. Warmer winters as a result of global warming is another factor 
contributing to the decrease of energy use, as they reduced the amount of energy used in 
heating.83  
The move away from solid fuels is quite prominent in many sectors, and figure 6.2 
shows a clear decline in absolute solid fuel import. Between 1990 and 2015, electricity 
generation replaced coal and lignite by electricity generation from natural gas during the 1990s 
up to 2010. The main reason for the shift were the decreasing gas prices. More recently, due to 
a combination of earlier mentioned factors, natural gas lost ground too. Although economic 
factors have played the main role in the energy transition of the EU, environmental factors 
cannot be overlooked as well. Solid fuels are closely associated with air pollution and climate 
change. Combustion of biomass can have similar impacts on air quality and climate change.  
The consumption of solid fuels like crude oil and coal leads to resource depletion and emissions 
of greenhouse gases as well as emissions of air pollutants (for example nitrogen oxides and 
sulphur dioxide). This, in turn, has negative consequences for public health and biodiversity. 
The degree of environmental impact depends on the relative share of different solid fuels and 
the extent to which pollution abatement measures are used. It has become clear that the 
substitution of coal and oil with cleaner alternatives contributes to significant reductions in 
greenhouse emissions in sectors closely linked to electricity consumption in particular. In fact, 
this substitution also contributes to the ongoing energy transition in the EU from an energy 
system that is based predominantly on solid fuels towards a system based on renewable and 






                                               






Far away in Russia’s hinterland, hidden under the permafrost, Russia’s greatest treasures: 
enormous gas and oil fields. The harsh conditions in the Arctic and Siberia make it difficult to 




Russia is known to have the largest natural gas reserve and the second largest coal reserve in 
the world. They are the largest crude oil producers with an average of 11.2 million barrels a day 
and the second largest produces or natural gas, producing an estimated 57.5 billion cubic feet 
per day.85  
 Since industrial times, Russia has been a central player in the world oil market. Czarist 
Russia was around the turn of the twentieth century the number one oil exporter in the world. 
During the Soviet era, they were the major supplier of oil and gas to their Comecon allies in 
Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union began exporting oil to the West in the 1970’s. At that time, 
Israel was at war with Syria and Egypt and the West supported Israel during this Yom Kippur 
War. As a result, Arab countries had imposed an oil embargo against several Western states. In 
1973 the first major Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe was built and went to 
Germany. In the 1980’s, due to dramatic fall in oil prices and a declining oil production, the 
Soviet Union lost a significant source of revenue. It is even suggested that this loss contributed 
to its collapse in 1991.86 The disruption of the reform period and the turmoil that was connected 
to the fall of the Soviet Union further weakened the oil and gas production. An erratic process 
of privatization of energy supplies took place during the 1990’s. Most of Russia’s oil fields and 
some of its natural gas resources became privately owned, leading to a further sharp reduction 
of energy production in Russia. Foreign investment in the Russian energy sector was 
encouraged and many of the world’s major energy companies invested in exploration, 
production or export projects in Russia. However, the largest share of Russia’s gas and oil assets 
during the 1990’s were acquired by only a handful of Russians often referred to as oligarchs. 
Some of them got control of the state energy riches in a legal manner during the tenure of the 
president Boris Yeltsin, but most oligarchs gained the resources by manipulation or through 
inside connections with governmental officials. The loans for shares program was one of the 
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major schemes. Under the program, cash loans were provided by privately owned banks to the 
Russian government. In return, they received a payment in ownership of gas and oil reserves. 
Government officials often cooperated in order to ensure that the government would default on 
the loans, so it would be possible for lenders the acquire energy resources at bargain prices. The 
new private companies were successful in rapidly increasing the energy production and a lot of 
them became active in commercial investments abroad. Oil concern Yukos was at the time one 
the most successful companies.87  
 Most of Russia’s oil production was in private hands when Putin came to power twenty 
years ago. His administration drastically changed the laissez-faire policy that had been common 
under Yeltsin towards private energy companies, foreign ownership and investment in Russia’s 
energy sector. Kremlin leadership claimed to represent state interest clashed with a group of 
wealthy oil magnets that had dominated the energy sector since privatization. So Moscow 
started to raise significant taxes on energy exports in order to get a larger proportion of the 
profits. Owners surrendered en masse their energy properties and went into exile. The most 
extreme case is the one of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former president of Yukos, who was 
eventually put in jail for tax evasion. The sale of the company’s assets was manipulated so that 
state-controlled Rosneft was able to gain the controlling interest.88 
 After the Yukos affair, the growing role of state in both economic and energy affairs 
became viable. Within five years, a large proportion of Russia’s energy sector was regained by 
the Russian state. Additionally, the Kremlin had full control over the oil pipeline transport 
system. Foreign investors in gas and oil production projects were further pushed out of the 
country in 2007 by using a series of threats to withdraw licenses for environmental reasons.89 
After Gazprom got involved in the projects that were relinquished by BP, Royal Dutch Shell 
and two Japanese companies, environmental concerns disappeared like snow in front of a sun. 
It is common for energy rich and oil producing states that revolutions and regime changes have 
as a consequence that production abruptly stops, and sometimes taking decades to recover. 
Russia managed to recover within nine years since the Soviet demise. Since 1999, energy export 
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Russian energy sector  
 
Russia’s political leadership and the energy sector are closely intertwined in both formal and 
informal ways since its recovery. Formally, senior Kremlin officials take part in the board of 
major state-controlled entities like Rosneft, Transneft and Gazprom. There is something like a 
revolving door for officials between the leadership of the state-controlled companies and the 
formal political structure. A sterling example is the election of former Gazprom chairman 
Dmitry Medvedev as successor of Putin at the presidential election in March 2008. 91   
Several ministries and regulatory agencies are in both the oil and gas sector involved. 
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment issues field licenses, monitors compliance 
with license agreements and levies fines for violations of environmental regulations. General 
energy policies are developed and implemented by the Ministry of Energy. The Ministry of 
Economic Development is in charge of the supervision of tariffs while export taxes are the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. The main regulatory agency that is involved in the 
gas sector is the Federal Antimonopoly Service. Pipeline tariffs, oversees charges of abuse of 
market dominance and charges that are related to third-party access to pipelines are regulated 
by this agency.92  
The most important players in Russia’s energy sector are Gazprom, Rosneft and 
Transneft. In 1989, Gazprom was established on the ruins of the Soviet Ministry of Gas 
Industry. The Russian government holds 51% of the shares, the rest is held by public 
shareholders. Shares were offered on the Russian stock market at the beginning of 1996. 
Gazprom dominates the market by producing 94% of Russia’s natural gas production. In the 
global context, they hold about 25% of the world’s known gas reserves and produces 16% of 
the global output. Not only are they the largest producer of natural gas in the world, they also 
control almost the entire natural gas production and pipeline network in Russia. While 
benefitting from their dominant position, Gazprom is also burdened with state responsibilities. 
By law, they are obligated to provide the gas for heat and power to Russia’s domestic market 
for government regulated prices. These prices barely cover the production costs and are one 
tenth of the price Gazprom receives from the export of their gas from the European market. In 
addition, Gazprom is required by Moscow to build expensive pipelines as bypass and parallel 
pipelines to European markets in order to decrease Russia’s dependence on transit states. 
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Besides that, Gazprom is in the comfortable position that they are able to ward off any 
competitors due to their control over the pipeline system.93 
The biggest company in the oil sector is Rosneft. Like Gazprom, the Russian state is the 
main shareholder. Although references of the company are traced back till the late 1800, 
Rosneft as it is today originated in 1995. After Yukos’ demise, Rosneft managed to gain 
controlling interest and it became the leading company in the Russian oil sector.94  
Russia has an extensive domestic distribution and export pipeline network. In the gas 
sector, Gazprom controls both extraction and the transportation. However, in the oil sector are 
extraction and distribution divided. The network system is almost completely controlled by 
Transneft. Transneft was established in 1992 as successor of Glavtransneft, which was a state 
entity during Soviet times. The only notable exception to their monopoly is the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) pipeline, which transports oil from Kazakhstan to Black Sea port of 
Novorossiysk. The CPC pipeline is a joint investment of several companies, but the largest 
share (24%) is owned by the Russian government, represented by Transneft.95 Although private 
and foreign companies have the option to explore and produce oil and natural gas in Russia, 
they are dependent on the already existing state-controlled infrastructure for the export of oil 
and gas. Consequently, the newcomers must have a good relationship with those companies 
and with Moscow in order to gain access to the export infrastructure. The Kremlin is able to 
retain control over the activities of foreign and other independent producers through the 
mechanism of keeping control over the export infrastructure. 96   
 
Russian energy and domestic politics 
 
Naturally, the enormous amount of energy resources in Russia has a high impact on the Russian 
economy which is driven by the energy export. Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
revenues from energy export have been Russia’s largest source of foreign earnings. 
Hydrocarbons, oil and natural gas revenues together account for 36% of the Russian federal 
budget revenues.97  
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The heavy dependence leaves Russia at great risk to the fluctuations of the prices of energy. 
The technological transition of the world energy sector from the dominance of solid fuels to 
low carbon energy resources is particularly threatening for Russia. Relative to existing trends, 
it would mean a reduction of 16% in fuel exports and 8% in primary energy production. As a 
consequence, it is expected that the GDP growth in Russia will slow down in 2016-2040 
by 1.7% to 0.6%. This was estimated before the COVID-19 crisis, so it is not unlikely that the 
Russian economy will now shrink instead of growth.98  
In recent years, the energy sector provided 20-23% of GDP, 25-26% of consolidated 
budget revenues and 55-60% hard currency export revenues. The role of the fuel and energy 
complex in the Russian economy was at its highest around 2012, 2013. Affected by shifts in 
the world economy, the last seven years their role is slowly declining. According to the Global 
Russian Energy Outlook 2019, the added value by fuel and energy sector will rise by 20% in 
the Energy Transition scenario and by 40% in the conservative scenario while its share in 
Russia’s GDP will decline to 14% and 17%. Due to the acceleration of the GDP growth in 
Russia, the end of the dominance of the fuel and energy complex in Russia’s national economy 
is near. The share of the oil industry in the GDP generated by the fuel and energy sector will 
decrease from 74% in 2015 to 61% by the end of the period in the conservative scenario and to 
47% in the Energy Transition scenario. This decrease is likely to be slightly compensated by 
the increase in the gas industry up to 51%.99 
At the same time as the sanctions were imposed by the US and the EU, oil prices halved 
from an average of $109 per barrel to less than $50 half a year later. A lot of pressure was put 
on the Russian economy resulting not only in a financial loss but also making it more difficult 
for the Russian energy sector to invest in new projects. What is interesting to mention is the 
lack of innovation in the energy sector: in 2016, Gazprom and Rosneft spend respectively 
0.095% and 0.02% of their turnover to research and development. To compare, Shell spend 
more than 10 times as much of their revenues on research and development.100 As consequence, 
Russia is dependent on Western partners for technology transfers. This is very 
counterproductive, since some of its promising projects have been abandoned due to the 
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sanctions. Especially high-cost projects such as in the Arctic, shale and deepwater faced the 
consequences of the sanctions and the fall in oil prices.101 This resulted in a dramatic decline in 
Russian state revenues from oil and natural gas. In response to the grown state’s budget deficit, 
the Russian government implemented a series of measures to increase revenues. Over the recent 
years, export taxes on hydrocarbons and mineral extraction tax have changed several times and 
the dividends from oil and gas companies of which the state is shareholder were collected. In 
2016, state-controlled companies were forced to pay at least 50% of net income as dividend, 
almost double of the dividends companies normally paid. Oil companies objected these plans 
and argued that they divert money from programs focused on capital investment. Rosneft 
negotiated a lower dividend based on similar arguments, but over 2017 they planned to pay 
50%. Alongside the tax increase and dividend payment, the Russian government sold some of 
their shared in several Russian companies, including Rosneft and Bashneft, but they kept 
enough shared to retain a controlling interest. It is also possible to compensate revenue losses 
by increased prices. This development can be considered as a typical indicator of energy politics 
Russia’s willingness to increase its advantage on the world market. Russia, the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and several other oil-producing states entered an 
agreement to limit production throughout 2016 in order to stabilize the oil market and regulate 
production depending on market demand. They extended the oil extraction cuts up to the end 
of March 2018.102 During a bilateral meeting in the margins of the G20 Summit in Osaka in 
June 2019, Putin and Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman agreed to extend 
the production cut again for a period of six to nine months.103  
The cooperation between Russia and OPEC stopped in March 2020 when Russia and 
Saudi Arabia (one of the most prominent members of OPEC) got into a trade war. The 
international demand for oil dropped to the lowest point in the last 15 years as a result of the 
COVID-19 crisis. During the summit in Vienna in March, OPEC called for an even further 
reduction of oil production. To Russia, this demand seemed pointless and ineffectual, so they 
rejected the request and started to increase its production. Directly after the announcement, oil 
prices dropped with 30% and the ruble lost 10% compared to the dollar. Few days later, Saudi 
Arabia announced an unexpected price discount on their oil, basically initiating a price war with 
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Russia. The market got overwhelmed with cheap oil. Although officials from both states have 
denied that they are engaged in a price war with each other, the conflict ended in April when 
the leaders came to an agreement to limit production again. The role of the US in this remained 
unclear, but he events were broadly covered in the American press. In the EU, the war was 
noticed but states were more focusing on the corona crisis.104   
Alongside the direct impact of the energy sector to the development of the Russian 
economy, it should be mentioned that the energy sector makes a significant indirect 
contribution, in particular though the power play between fuel and energy prices for consumers 
and through the size of capital investments in the production and use of energy resources. As 
President, Putin is a declared supporter of state involvement in the energy sector. He has stated 
that regardless of the ownership structure, the Russian state must play an active role in the 
regulation of the development and use of the energy sector. Therefore at times, state-controlled 
companies are compelled to undergo tasks that are determined by the state or by prices that 
were determined by the state which often leads to chagrin of company managers and private 
shareholders.105   
Rather than continuing the current heavy reliance on the energy industry, diversifying 
Russia’s real economy would bring new types of challenges for the Kremlin as the means to 
control the economy are far weaker than the state institutions that control Russia’s energy 
sector. Most governments of energy export driven states are conservative in their thinking, 
making achieving economic diversification a major challenge. Given the global trends such as 
the shift toward LNG, the request for renewable energies but also domestic developments like 
the need to modernize Russian infrastructures in order to maintain energy competitiveness and 
the necessity to move away from the energy dependence economy are challenges for Russia’s 
energy politics. It is likely that energy politics will remain a key component of the countries 
presence in world politics, however they need to evolve their strategies to respond to today’s 
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Russian energy and foreign politics 
 
An integral element of Russia’s overall foreign policy are the energy export policies. It was 
already mentioned that the energy sector plays an important role in domestic politics, but 
naturally they also effect the state’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, compared to other major energy 
producers, Russia has a far more diversified economy than most of them. In particular compared 
to Persian Gulf states, which are almost fully dependent on their oil export.  
A study, carried out in 2018 by the European Parliamentary Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (AFET), studied how energy-exporting countries and in particular Russia, use energy 
as a means to protect and promote their foreign policy interests. They argue that the foundation 
of Russia’s energy wealth are their incredible energy resources and their vast system of pipeline 
networks. This combination has created a system in which countries became dependent on 
Russia for their energy supplies, thereby creating broader economic and political dependencies 
which translates into a source of power for Moscow.107   
 There is a central role for geography in Russia’s energy export opportunities and 
policies. The world’s two major energy import markets, the EU and China, both border Russia, 
making it the obvious supplier. Russia’s geography, in particular its size and climate serve at 
the same time as potential constraint. Due to its climate conditions, Russian ports are not year-
round operational. Consequently, the energy sector is dependent on routing exports through 
transit states.108  
 The AFET committee concludes that the Russian governments perceives its energy 
resources as a strategic resource to stimulate economic development and as important 
geopolitical tool.  Policy documents show that reducing the dependence on transit states is a 
major feature in Russia’s energy and foreign policies. In the Energy strategy of Russia for the 
period up to 2030 it is mentioned that “export infrastructure must be sufficiently diversified to 
allow exports in all directions.”109 Due to limited sea access for oil export and the need to rely 
on pipelines to export natural gas, Russia is dependent on transit states to export the bulk of its 
natural gas and a large proportion of its oil. Their dependence and their drive to reduce their 
vulnerability are both important aspects of Russia’s energy export and foreign policies. 
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Complicating Russia’s energy export is the fact that some of Russia’s transit states are NATO 
members with whom they do not have particularly friendly relations. Most of Russia’s oil 
export goes through the port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea and through transit states along 
the Druzhba (friendship) pipeline to Eastern Europe, both vulnerable and complicated routes. 
In 2013, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “strengthen its strategic partnership 
with major producers of energy resources while actively promoting dialogue with consumers 
and transit countries” is Russia its goal in the energy field. This did not turn out as general 
objective as Russia quickly translated it in actions in both the oil and gas market such as 
spending large funds to build transit pipelines, weighing on prices, investing in the North 
African and Middle Eastern region, increasing its supply to Asia while mastering its supplies 
to the EU.110   
If energy is used as geopolitical tool, natural gas through pipeline lends itself better than 
crude oil supplies. Brenda Shaffer, professor at Georgetown University and specialist in energy 
policies writes that Gazprom’s policies are shaped by both commercial considerations as well 
as Russia’s foreign policy objectives. According to her, not every bit of Russia’s energy policy 
is dictated by geopolitical motives, but if so, they exert political pressure through the following 
means: manipulating pricing policy of energy supplies to third countries, controlling energy 
assets such as pipelines and gas operations in key countries, cutting or disrupting gas supplies, 
agreeing restrictive supply contracts and developing alternative supply routes. She supports the 
view of the AFET committee that Russia gains geopolitical influence by making investments 
in the energy sectors of geopolitically relevant countries such as Iraq or Venezuela.111  
It is known that Russia is investing in energy links with China and other Asian countries. 
When completed, it allows Russia to supply very large energy markets and it would reduce the 
dependence of Russia on the European gas market. Yet, Shaffer argues that one of Russia’s 
main energy goals is to sustain its role as the main exporter to the European gas market. To 
ensure their position, Russia invested in extremely expensive infrastructure that bypasses transit 
states and purchasing routes that potential competitors such as Iran and Turkmenistan could 
allow to enter the European market directly.112  
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Russia and Europe 
 
Russia has developed strong political and economic relations with their key purchasers, in 
particular with Europe. The energy sector profited from this relationship when they were 
excluded from European sanctions following the Crimean annexation and the conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine. That did not stop the United States for imposing strict sanctions. Amongst 
other measurements, the sanctions limited Russian firms’ access to the US capital markets, in 
particularly four big Russian energy companies: Novatek, Rosneft, Gazprom and Transneft. 
The U.S saw an opportunity to target their energy competitors and took it. Furthermore, the 
sanctions prohibited the export of Russian goods, services and technology in support of 
deepwater, Artic offshore and shale projects. In 2017, additional sanctions on entities or persons 
providing support to energy export pipelines were imposed. This does not mean that the EU did 
nothing in 2014. They did impose similar sanctions under American pressure, but the left the 
energy sector mostly out of it.113 
 According to the Energy Information Administration, it is unlikely that Arctic offshore 
and shale resources can be developed without the help of Western oil companies. However, it 
is expected that the sanctions on the short term will have a minor effect on the Russian 
production as these resources are not going into production for 5 to 10 years at the earliest. But 
the immediate effect of the sanctions is visible, as they have reduced the large-scale investments 
that Western firms planned to make in these resources. That does not stop Russia from currently 
constructing the ‘Power of Siberia,’ a new pipeline to China. This creates a second major gas 
market for Russia and as a result, the Russian dependence on gas income from the EU will 
decrease. The AFET committee fears that this will create more space for Russia to pursue “a 
more assertive foreign policy, possibly against European interests. [..] A long as Russia is 
dependent on Europe as its primary export market, its ability to use its energy muscle to promote 
its foreign policy objectives is constrained.”114   
While Russia is concerned with the access and security of its energy markets, some 
purchasers including the EU, wonder whether Russia can be trusted as a reliable energy 
supplier. The conclusions of the AFET report are firm. They conclude that Gazprom is able to 
abuse their market power due to their monopolist role. Furthermore, they state that the antitrust 
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investigators of the EU are an important instrument to control if Russia is pursuing monopolistic 
practices which there are able to by creating dependency and keeping markets fragmented. 115   
In 2011, the EU Commission had launched an antitrust investigation after accusations 
of Gazprom’s abuse of their dominant market position in Eastern Europe. According to 
Commission, Gazprom contracts hindered cross border flow of gas which resulted in 
fragmentation of regional market and different prices per country. In the ensuing negotiations, 
Gazprom committed to remove contractual barriers to cross border flow of gas. It linked gas 
prices in Eastern EU to benchmark prices in Western EU hubs. Gazprom’s commitments will 
adjust prices in Eastern Europe because they are isolated due to lack of infrastructure to market-
based prices Western Europe. Gazprom avoided a fine imposed by the commission by making 
these commitments. They had to make important concessions and essentially change its 
marketing strategy from oil-linked contracts to more market-based lower prices. Failure to 
honor the commitments could still lead to Gazprom being fined over the next years.116 
Meanwhile, Russia filed a complaint with the WTO about the EU in April 2014. In 
2009, the EU Commission had introduced a third energy package with the aim of integrating 
the EU energy market and increasing competition. One of the requirements is unbundling the 
ownership of energy production and supply from that of energy transportation. Russia argued 
that this legislation treated Russian gas and gas transport unfairly. The WTO ruled that the main 
principles are lawful, but some aspects were not in line with WTO norms.117 
In his article “Russia and Europe’s mutual energy dependence,” Christophe- Alexandre 
Paillard argues that Eu-Russian energy relations are a two-way phenomenon. He stresses that 
EU leader do not realize how fragile Russia is considering their own energy dependence.118 The 
AFET committee acknowledges that there is a system of mutual dependence, but they conclude 
that Russia is creating this system. Therefore, they ignore the fact that the EU itself does little 
to diversify the number of their energy suppliers. In the report, they write that the current 
situation is so that Russia is dependent on the EU as their primary export market, but they fear 
this could change. “Russia’s use of energy blackmail as a tool in Europe will increase as Russia 
diversifies its markets, primarily by developing its energy ties to China.”119 They expect the 
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role of Russian energy on the European market to growth and therefore they suggest the EU to 
prepare for a future where Russia might be in a position in which they use their energy supply 
as foreign policy tool. The European Commission should be on making sure that the internal 
energy market works properly. The best insurance for a stable energy supply is to focus on the 
availability of alternative supplies. This can be created by enforcing new EU energy laws, 
building sufficient gas infrastructure and storage within the EU, promoting availability of 
alternative sources such as LNG and promoting transparency on contracts. They even suggest 
the European Commission to negotiate energy contracts with suppliers on behalf of EU member 
states. However, they should realize that this idea is against the principle of a liberalized energy 
market. EU member states are currently free in their decision of their energy mix and various 
suppliers are able to compete with each other. The AFET committee realizes that such collective 
bargaining is only possible on voluntary basis. With the current divisions within the EU about 
Russia as energy supplier, it is not likely that something like collective bargaining will happen 
soon.120  
Maroš Šefčovič, former Vice-President of the European Energy Union held a speech 
about the ‘State of play of EU-Russia energy relations.’ According to him, interdependence in 
the field of energy will remain foreseeable in the future. Security of gas supply currently 
dominates todays discussions, but energy relations between the EU and Russia are not limited 
to gas. The EU should focus on the Southern Corridor and new liquid hubs in the Mediterranean 
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In the energy policies of the EU, the European dependence on Russian energy is an important 
factor. The Soviet Union started to export oil to the West after the first oil crisis in 1973, and 
since then energy trade has been a key feature in relations between the EU and Russia. Energy 
and geopolitics are closely related to each other. Gas and oil trade have shown many examples 
such as the oil crises and gas disruptions due to political tensions. Disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine exposed the vulnerability of the EU regarding their dependence on Russian energy. 
Energy became one of the most politicised topics within the EU and it deeply divided its 
member states.  
 It is expected that the energy demand of the EU will increase in the upcoming years. 
Simultaneously, several member states closed their domestic coal and nuclear power stations 
which means that a lot of extra import capacity is needed to meet the extra demand. These 
projects are not uncontroversial, as critics like to emphasize the increasing dependence of the 
EU on Russia. This thesis investigated how the dependence of the EU on Russian energy was 
characterized during 2005 and 2017 and how it reflects in European energy policy. 
 The first common EU energy policy was published in January 2007. During the 1990’s, 
there had been several attempts, but member states did not manage to formulate a common 
policy. A new impulse for this was given during the so-called Hampton Court meeting in 2005. 
All European leaders came together to discuss several aspects of the future of Europe, amongst 
which energy was one of the topics. After the meeting, a paper about energy challenges was 
published by the EU Commission. This was followed by the establishment of a European 
Energy Council. The Council examined the possibilities for a common energy strategy and 
wanted to deliver a European response to new energy challenges such as increasing import 
dependency, volatile energy prices, a strong growing global energy demand and global 
warming. The Commission wanted to go a step further as they pushed for a common policy 
instead of a common strategy. When the first common policy was presented, it was basically 
an elaboration of the energy strategy that was published a year before. Sustainability, 
competitiveness and security of supply became the pillars of the EU energy policy. In the 
policy, the Commission stressed the political and economic risk of energy dependence. They 
proposed an action plan that was focused on the creation of an internal energy market as they 
believed this would decrease member states dependence on their energy supply. Although the 
Commission indicated that they have confidence in the EU’s energy suppliers, the desire for 
diversification remained. They made three proposals in order to promote energy security. The 
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first proposal was to assist member states to diversify their sources, the second one was the 
development of projects with gas from new regions and the final proposal was the make 
investments in storage and pipeline capacity of strategic gas stocks.  
 The most important change in the process of creating a common policy was the Treaty 
of the Functioning of the EU. This was a part of the Lisbon Treaty that was singed on the 1st of 
December 2009 and shaped the EU as it is today. With the treaty, member states transferred 
exclusive control over several strategic areas, including energy, from national level to European 
level. Energy policies shifted from the exclusive authority of individual member states to 
primary legislation. This means that from then foreword, all energy related issues were included 
in the shared powers of the EU and its member states.  
 Several gas disputes in 2006 and 2008 between Ukraine and Russia had a direct impact 
on EU citizens as the disputes resulted in disruptions of gas supplies. The topic of energy 
security began to gain dominance within Europe’s political debate and it became evident for 
EU policy makes that the European strategies regarding energy security and the approach 
towards energy supply had to be revised. However, the splintered policy landscape within the 
EU made it difficult to harmonize and integrate Europe’s energy governance. A great push for 
the EU into dealing with these problems was the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in March 
2014. As tensions between the EU and Russia heated, the EU feared (partial) reduction of 
Russian energy and energy security became the number one topic in the EU. In response to 
those concerns, a new energy strategy was released by the Commission two months after the 
annexation. The emphasize of the strategy was on a stable and abundant energy supply. The 
report turned out to be one of the first signs of the changing climate of the EU’s energy policies 
as it was written with a remarkable geopolitical tone. The collective approach became the core 
of new energy policies as the Commission stressed the need for cooperation and solidarity 
amongst EU member states. Another major impulse towards a unified energy policy came from 
the then President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, when took the opportunity to propose 
an Energy Union. Jean-Claude Junker, at that time President of the European Commission, 
picked up the idea of the Union and in February 2015, the Strategy for the Energy Union was 
accepted. Energy security, sustainability and competitiveness remained the same pillars as the 
earlier adopted energy policy, but the central point shifted from security to resilience. Reducing 
overall dependence of EU economies became key to enhance resilience.  
 The reason that less emphasis was placed on a collective approach was due to the fact 
that member states still had their own energy policies besides the ones from the EU. The 
Commission tried hard to pursue common policies but there were structural obstacles for having 
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one. As energy policies are considered as component of national security, it is understandable 
that member states have shown not much willingness to give up energy related sovereignty. 
Furthermore, one of the difficulties in the negotiations for a common policy is the disunited 
attitude and the different energy structures of member states.  
 The Nord Stream pipeline project is a perfect example of the difficulties of the formation 
of a common European energy policy. The project created friction between several member 
states and has ignited heated debates. Central to the debate is the dependence on Russian energy. 
Countries like Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and France were in favor of the project and 
argued that it is a solution for the increasing energy demand in the EU. Opponents like Poland, 
Slovakia, Romania and the Baltic states pointed out that the project increases the European 
dependence on Russian energy and they fear Russia might use that as political leverage. The 
Commission was stuck between these opposing views and at first, they tried to define a legal 
framework. Their request was rejected by the Legal Service of the Council and so the project 
went ahead, and the construction started in April 2010. Despite the tensions and frictions that 
the project causes, a second pipeline, known as the Nord Stream 2, has now been constructed. 
 A legal footing for energy relations is in the interest of all trade partners in order to 
enhance certainty. Although several multilateral and bilateral legal instruments have been 
created since the 1990’s, a current comprehensive and effective legal energy framework does 
not exist. However, there are some regimes that have created a strong basis for EU-Russian 
energy cooperation. The first one that came into existence is the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement. The agreement is an overall framework for political dialogue with the aim on free 
trade and a special emphasis on the energy sector. The Energy Charter Treaty was created to 
combine Western concerns and interests regarding the security of energy supplies with the 
Eastern energy assets. The treaty is a binding legal instrument and it is the only one between 
the EU and Russia that deals with the energy sectors and includes both governments and private 
parties. During an EU- Russia summit, the Energy Dialogue was established. The dialogue is 
aimed at integrating both energy markets, reforming the Russian energy industry and trying to 
incorporate the existing rules of the EU energy market in Russia. Although they annually 
publish their results in several reports, the effectiveness of the dialogue is limited because of its 
non-binding nature. The final legal instrument is the World Trade Organization. It is not a 
specific EU-Russia agreement, but they enjoy a high degree of legitimacy that can be attributed 
to the thickening of legality and effective dispute settlement. The WTO is worth mentioning 
because energy trade has dominated the WTO negotiation agenda, even though it is not 
addressed as distinctive sector. The main difficulty for the EU to come with a special energy 
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framework with Russia are the considerable diverge of interests between all EU member states. 
In particular between Western and Eastern states, it has been difficult to reach agreement and 
find acceptable compromises. 
 The primary energy consumption of the EU consists for 72% of crude oil, natural gas, 
solid fossil fuels. The remaining part is composed of renewable and nuclear energy. Concerning 
energy, the EU is a net importer, meaning they import more energy than they produce 
themselves. Especially oil, gas and solid fuels are largely imported, renewable and nuclear 
energy are mostly produced with the EU itself. For 2017, 30.3% of oil, 39.8% of the gas and 
38.8% of solid fuel came from Russia, making it Europe’s main supplier. It should be noted 
that there are clear patterns between different member states. Concerning oil, the most 
dependent member states on Russia are Slovakia (74.0%), Finland (71.9%), Poland (68.5%), 
Lithuania (61.8%) and Bulgaria (50.2%). This is compensated by eight member states that 
import 0% of their oil from Russia. However, every member state is depended on multiple 
suppliers. With regards to gas, a different dependence pattern emerges. Finland, Estonia, Latvia 
and Bulgaria get 100% of their gas from Russia and five other member states have no other 
external supplier as well. On the other hand, eleven member states do not have any gas 
connection with Russia. A clear pattern of dependence is also visible with regard to solid fuels. 
Russia is exporting the most solid fuels to Estonia (100%), Latvia (98.2%), Lithuania (94.4%), 
Greece (90.0%) and Bulgaria (81.7%). Six member states do not import any solid fuel from 
Russia. The entire overview of the origin of energy imports per member state can be found on 
page 24-26.  
 What can be concluded from this is that the number of suppliers and the extent of 
dependence of each member state on Russia varies heavenly between oil, gas and fossil fuels. 
The EU developed a dependency rate to determine to what extend the EU is dependent of energy 
import. The overall EU dependency rate is 55%, meaning the import more energy than they 
export. The question is, is dependency a problem? To answer that, the total dependency rate of 
each member state with the extent they depend on their main suppliers should be combined. A 
high proportion of energy imports among few external partners possibly threatens the stability 
of the EU’s energy supply. Therefore, it can be stated that a low dependence rate is not the only 
factor in energy security, the number of external suppliers is just as important. The EU import 
picture of today is still dominated by few major external suppliers, of whom Russia is by far 
the biggest one. This problem is reflected in European policy which focuses on diversifying 
sources and suppliers of energy. The Southern Gas Corridor is one of the key projects of the 
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EU in their diversification efforts. Furthermore, the EU is expanding the LNG import capacity 
and is strengthening the reverse flow capacities.  
 The influence of Soviet heritage is still visible in the current European energy landscape. 
Most of the new member states that joined the EU since 2004 are still disproportionately 
dependent on Russia as energy supplier as a result of the old Soviet infrastructure. This higher 
degree of dependency has led to contrasting attitudes where Western European countries deal 
with Russia’s energy in a pragmatic way while Eastern European countries lobby at EU level 
to break away from Russia in an attempt to reduce their overreliance on Russian energy. 
Policymakers at European level find it difficult to deal with these contrasting views. They are 
sensitive to arguments from Eastern European states in regard to dependence on Russia, but at 
the same time they do not want to disturb their cherished free market. This is reflected in 
European policy through calls for cooperation, a joint approach et cetera, but few concrete 
measures have been taken to drastically diversify the number of suppliers. Such big decisions 
are not taken immediately, but even after many years of debate, it turned out to be difficult for 
the EU to make acceptable decisions that please all member states.  
 Besides an overview of EU dependence in 2017, the development of the dependence on 
Russian energy per energy sector since 2005 is compared to determine if the EU has become 
more or less dependent on Russian energy. In Chapter 3: Increase or Decrease, the five member 
states that import the most energy are included in the figures because they gave a nice idea of 
the development of European energy imports. However, because they only indicate the 
dependence development at an individual member state level, they are less relevant for the 
conclusions. Therefore, they shall not be discussed, and the conclusions are only based on the 
total percentage that was imported from Russia. Starting with oil, figure 5.1 shows a small 
increase of 1.2% between 2005 and 2017. In absolute numbers, the amount of oil that was 
transported from Russia to the EU decreased. Surprisingly, the gas import from Russia has 
increased with the exact same amount of 1.2% between 2005 and 2017 but other than oil, the 
absolute import has increased as well. Solid fuels increased even with 13.1% between 2005 and 
2017, but their absolute import decreased. To conclude in short: EU dependency on Russian 
energy increased in the oil, gas and solid fuel sector.  
 This outcome seems to be surprising given the political tensions between the EU and 
Russia and the desire of the EU to diversify its sources. As mentioned before, the EU has done 
not that much to actually diversify their energy suppliers and these measures take a very long 
time to implement and execute. The sanctions which the EU imposed following the events in 
2014 left the energy sector largely unscathed. The explanation for increasing dependence can 
 58 
be found outside politics as they are mostly economic reasons. Increasing dependence can be 
explained by the economic recovery of the EU since 2008, lower prices of Russian energy, a 
decrease of domestic energy production which needed to be compensated and a boost from the 
global energy transition in switching from coal to gas. Although not all member states are 
pleased with these developments, Russian energy is the most logical option as it is the most 
competitive one in terms of prize and possibilities. The infrastructure already exists, and 
Russian energy is structurally cheaper than its alternatives.  
 Unfortunately, there was no data available after 2017 but looking at several EU policies 
gave some insight into future European energy trends. What is remarkable, is that despite the 
increase of Russian energy import, the EU overall energy consumption has actually decreased 
since 2005. In 2017, the primary energy use of the EU was 9% lower than in 2005. Overall, the 
share of non-renewable fuels has decreased, while over the same period the share of renewable 
fuels has significantly increased. The overall reduction of the use of energy of the EU can 
generally be attributed to energy efficiency improvements, structural changes in the European 
economy and warmer winters. This fits into the policy of the new President of the European 
Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who presented an ambitious climate programme. The 
Commission wants to reduce carbon emissions to 0% by 2050. Concerning energy, they 
proposed to completely transit to clean energy, meaning the elimination of the use of coals and 
the use of gas is only allowed if the CO2 emissions are being captured.  
 It is not a coincidence that Russia is Europe’s main energy supplier. Not only are they 
Europe’s neighbor, they also possess the largest natural gas reserve and second largest coal 
reserve in the world. Like all industries, the energy sector was state business during Soviet 
times. After the revolution a capricious process of privatization of the energy sector took place. 
Yeltsin encouraged foreign investments but most of the shares of energy enterprises were 
acquired by oligarchs either through a legal manner or, as in most cases, through connections 
and manipulations. When Putin came into office, he stopped privatization and regained the 
controlling share in energy affairs. Since then, the energy sector and Russian leadership are 
both formally and informally closely intertwined.  
Several ministries and regulatory agencies that are involved in the energy sector are: the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Economic 
Development, the Ministry of Finance and the Federal Antimonopoly Service. The most 
important players in Russia’s energy sector are Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft. Gazprom 
dominates the gas market as they control almost the entire gas production as well as the pipeline 
network. As the state holds the majority of shares, this leaves Gazprom with benefits such as 
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warding off any competitors but also with responsibilities like providing Russia’s domestic 
market against prices that hardly cover any production costs. The main stars of the oil sector 
are Rosneft and Transneft. Like Gazprom, the Russian state is the main shareholder, but the 
difference between the gas and oil sector is that in the oil sector, extraction and distribution are 
divided. Rosneft controls everything concerning extraction, while Transneft has the monopoly 
over the extensive pipeline network. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium is the only exception to 
this. Although private and foreign companies have the option to explore and produce oil and 
natural gas in Russia, they are dependent on the already existing state-controlled infrastructure 
for the export of oil and gas. Consequently, the newcomers must have a good relationship with 
those companies and with Moscow in order to gain access to the export infrastructure. 
 Compared to other major energy producers, Russia has a far more diversified economy 
than most of them. Nevertheless, Russia’s economy is driven by the energy export, as revenues 
from energy exports account for 36% of the Russian federal budget revenues. Naturally, this 
heavy dependence entails several risks. Particularly threatening for Russia is the global 
transition into clean energy and price fluctuations. The Russian government understands that 
and since several years, the role importance of energy revenues is declining. Nevertheless, as 
energy revenues are still dominant, Russia has received some big hits recently. Imposed 
sanctions resulted in halving of the oil prices. Not only was that a big financial loss, it also 
meant troubles with investing in new projects. And precisely those projects, is where it hurts. 
Russia is dependent on Western partners for technology transfers, but due to the sanctions some 
promising projects in the Arctic have been abandoned. In response to the grown state’s budget 
deficit, the Russian government implemented a series of measures to increase revenues. They 
increased taxes, forced dividends payments and even sold some shares, although they kept 
enough to remain the majority. Eventually, they agreed with the demand from OPEC to limit 
production between 2016 until 2020. However, their cooperation ended in March 2020 when 
Russia increased its production against OPEC’s demand. This immediately backfired and at the 
end of April they reached an agreement in which they settled on new production limitations.  
Alongside direct contributions, the energy sector makes a significant indirect impact as well. 
Therefore, Putin is a declared supporter of state involvement in the energy sector. There are a 
lot of challenges for the Russian energy sector such as shifts to LNG and renewable energy, the 
need to modernize domestic infrastructures and to maintain their competitiveness. Yet, the most 
important challenge is going to be economic diversification.  
 The Russian energy sector is not only a valuable component of their domestic politics, 
it also contributes to Russia’s foreign politics. The conclusions of the influence of the energy 
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sector on foreign policies are based on the conclusion of the AFET committee of the EU. They 
conclude that the Russian government uses their energy resources as strategic resource to 
stimulate economic development and as important geopolitical tool. The combination of an 
enormous amount of energy resources and a vast system of pipeline networks has resulted in a 
system in which countries became dependent on Russia for their energy supplies, thereby 
creating broader economic and political dependencies which translates into a source of power 
for Moscow.  
What is interesting, is that AFET committee barely discusses the topic of mutual 
dependence. Several scholars have brought up that the energy relationship between the EU and 
Russia has a balance in interests and expectations on both sides. Christophe- Alexandre Paillard 
pointed out that that EU leaders do not realize how fragile Russia is considering their own 
energy dependence. In European policy, the fear op dependence is evident, as diversification is 
stressed time and again. However, Russia is also aware of the risks of dependence. This can be 
concluded based on policy documents that have shown that reducing the dependence on transit 
states is a major feature in Russia’s energy and foreign policies. In order to meet this objective, 
Russia invests in new energy links with China and other Asian markets. The AFET committee 
has noted these developments and fears that it will provide Moscow an opportunity to pursue a 
more assertive foreign policy. They make several suggestions for the Commission to take upon 
in future energy strategies/ policies. Their most important conclusion is EU should be to prepare 
for a future in which Russia might be in a position in which they use their energy supply as 
foreign policy tool.  
 
This brings us to the core of the thesis. The EU is dependent on Russia as main supplier when 
it comes to oil, gas and solid fuels. Although there is a mutual dependence in the energy 
relationship between the EU and Russia, the EU fears disruptions in the energy trade. This is 
reflected in EU policy that, since 2009, has been made at a European level in addition to national 
policies. The core of EU energy policy is diversification of energy sources, decreasing 
dependence and a desire for a collective European approach. The latter proves difficult, as 
dependence on Russian energy has deeply divided the EU. Based on their past and economic 
motives, member states have different feelings towards Russia’s motives. Nevertheless, events 
in 2014 seem to have changed the European perspective and there has been more unity within 
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Table 7   European gas import from Russia in percentages 2005-2017 
1) Share of imports of Natural Gas that originated from Russia per EU member state per year (%) 
 and  
2) Contribution to total EU imports of Natural Gas per EU member state per year (%) 
 2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  2017 
EU Member state 1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2) 
                     
Total EU* 35.0%   33.0%   28.0%   28.3%   32.6%   31.9%   36.2%  
Austria 70.8% 2.5%  57.0% 2.5%  68.2% 2.6%  63.8% 3.1%  63.2% 2.5%  64.6% 2.9%  64.6% 2.9% 
Belgium 4.9% 4.6%  4.5% 4.6%  2.9% 5.4%  0.0% 5.1%  0.0% 4.6%  0.0% 4.5%  0.0% 3.8% 
Bulgaria 100.0% 0.8%  100.0% 0.8%  100.0% 0.6%  100.0% 0.6%  100.0% 0.6%  100.0% 0.7%  100.0% 0.7% 
Croatia 100.0% 0.3%  100.0% 0.3%  95.8% 0.3%  0.0% 0.2%  0.0% 0.3%  0.0% 0.3%  0.0% 0.4% 
Cyprus No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0% 
Czech Republic 76.1% 2.4%  78.2% 2.1%  65.4% 2.1%  97.0% 2.2%  100.0% 2.0%  99.8% 1.8%  99.2% 1.9% 
Denmark No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  0.0% 0.2%  0.0% 0.3%  0.0% 0.2%  0.0% 0.1% 
Estonia 100.0% 0.3%  100.0% 0.2%  100.0% 0.2%  100.0% 0.1%  100.0% 0.2%  100.0% 0.1%  100.0% 0.1% 
Finland 100.0% 1.1%  100.0% 1.2%  100.0% 1.1%  100.0% 1.0%  100.0% 0.8%  100.0% 0.7%  100.0% 0.5% 
France 19.7% 12.3%  13.6% 11.0%  15.7% 11.6%  13.5% 11.6%  19.5% 11.5%  12.8% 10.7%  18.7% 10.2% 
Germany 40.6% 24.1%  43.4% 21.8%  33.7% 21.6%  36.7% 20.9%  40.9% 23.4%  42.6% 24.7%  52.3% 24.8% 
Greece 84.5% 0.7%  77.5% 1.0%  56.9% 0.9%  59.8% 1.1%  99.9% 0.9%  61.6% 0.8%  58.2% 1.0% 
Hungary 73.4% 3.1%  99.2% 2.6%  82.7% 2.4%  99.2% 1.9%  95.0% 2.0%  95.0% 1.6%  95.0% 2.8% 
Ireland 0.0% 0.9%  0.0% 1.1%  0.0% 1.2%  0.0% 1.1%  0.0% 1.0%  0.0% 1.0%  0.0% 0.3% 
Italy 31.8% 18.8%  30.7% 18.6%  28.9% 17.0%  28.1% 16.4%  45.3% 14.8%  45.1% 14.8%  47.5% 14.6% 
Latvia 100.0% 0.5%  100.0% 0.4%  100.0% 0.4%  100.0% 0.4%  100.0% 0.4%  100.0% 0.3%  100.0% 0.3% 
Lithuania 100.0% 0.8%  100.0% 0.9%  100.0% 0.7%  100.0% 0.8%  100.0% 0.6%  100.0% 0.6%  53.7% 0.5% 
Luxembourg 4.9% 0.3%  23.5% 0.3%  24.0% 0.3%  24.0% 0.3%  25.2% 0.2%  25.3% 0.2%  25.3% 0.2% 
Malta No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  0.0% 0.1% 
Netherlands 19.3% 5.9%  18.2% 6.6%  14.1% 6.3%  8.4% 5.6%  14.1% 7.3%  19.6% 9.8%  17.3% 11.4% 
Poland 66.0% 2.7%  67.7% 2.5%  82.0% 2.4%  85.5% 2.7%  77.1% 3.0%  72.5% 2.9%  65.6% 3.3% 
Portugal 0.0% 1.1%  0.0% 1.1%  0.0% 1.2%  0.0% 1.2%  0.0% 1.1%  0.0% 1.1%  0.0% 1.3% 
Romania 100.0% 1.3%  91.3% 1.2%  98.7% 0.5%  86.0% 0.7%  91.7% 0.3%  90.1% 0.0%  98.9% 0.3% 
Slovakia 100.0% 1.9%  99.2% 1.6%  100.0% 1.4%  100.0% 1.4%  95.0% 1.3%  100.0% 1.1%  100.0% 1.1% 
Slovenia 59.8% 0.3%  51.1% 0.3%  48.5% 0.3%  48.0% 0.2%  57.9% 0.2%  30.0% 0.2%  30.0% 0.2% 
Spain 0.0% 9.0%  0.0% 9.2%  0.0% 9.0%  0.0% 8.3%  0.0% 8.5%  0.0% 7.8%  0.0% 7.2% 
Sweden 0.0% 0.2%  0.0% 0.3%  0.0% 0.3%  0.0% 0.3%  0.0% 0.3%  0.0% 0.2%  0.0% 0.2% 
United Kingdom 0.0% 4.0%  0.0% 7.7%  0.0% 10.4%  0.0% 12.7%  0.0% 11.8%  0.0% 10.9%  0.0% 9.9% 
                     
 




Table 8   European oil import from Russia in percentages 2005-2017 
1) Share of imports of Crude Oil that originated from Russia per EU member state per year (%) 
 and  
2) Contribution to total EU imports of Crude Oil per EU member state per year (%) 
 2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  2017 
EU Member state 1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2) 
                     
Total EU* 24.0%   24.8%   26.1%   26.6%   27.7%   25.4%   25.2%  
Austria 14.7% 1.2%  1.6% 1.3%  2.2% 1.3%  8.9% 1.4%  8.0% 1.5%  5.5% 1.5%  3.7% 1.3% 
Belgium 27.5% 5.0%  31.6% 5.3%  26.5% 5.3%  29.8% 5.2%  29.4% 5.2%  25.5% 5.6%  33.3% 6.0% 
Bulgaria 69.5% 0.0%  52.5% 0.0%  59.0% 1.0%  78.0% 0.9%  78.8% 1.1%  66.2% 1.0%  50.2% 1.2% 
Croatia 62.3% 0.0%  69.4% 0.0%  66.9% 0.0%  46.6% 0.0%  48.7% 0.0%  20.5% 0.4%  12.0% 0.5% 
Cyprus 1.6% 0.0%  0.9% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.1% 0.0%  1.2% 0.0%  0.2% 0.0%  0.3% 0.0% 
Czech Republic 50.6% 1.2%  44.3% 1.2%  49.8% 1.2%  40.7% 1.3%  42.7% 1.2%  36.5% 0.0%  35.2% 0.0% 
Denmark 9.9% 1.2%  7.6% 1.3%  3.4% 1.3%  12.4% 1.2%  14.2% 1.4%  32.8% 1.3%  21.8% 1.4% 
Estonia 30.9% 0.0%  27.3% 0.0%  24.2% 0.0%  9.3% 0.0%  16.3% 0.0%  24.5% 0.0%  29.8% 0.0% 
Finland 72.2% 1.7%  70.2% 2.0%  77.6% 2.1%  47.9% 2.2%  71.0% 2.3%  70.5% 2.0%  79.9% 2.2% 
France 13.8% 13.6%  15.9% 13.4%  18.7% 12.6%  18.7% 12.0%  14.5% 10.8%  11.5% 10.4%  14.6% 10.4% 
Germany 26.9% 18.0%  26.0% 17.4%  27.9% 17.1%  30.2% 16.3%  27.8% 16.4%  29.5% 15.4%  31.4% 13.3% 
Greece 34.1% 3.0%  28.5% 3.2%  29.9% 3.3%  24.3% 2.6%  31.9% 3.5%  26.2% 3.9%  19.6% 4.1% 
Hungary 78.9% 1.2%  80.1% 1.3%  78.0% 1.2%  84.6% 1.2%  77.1% 1.1%  59.4% 1.2%  42.7% 1.2% 
Ireland 0.0% 0.5%  0.0% 0.6%  0.0% 0.5%  0.0% 0.6%  0.2% 0.6%  0.6% 0.6%  4.5% 0.6% 
Italy 20.3% 13.4%  20.0% 13.9%  18.6% 11.8%  16.2% 11.9%  21.7% 9.9%  15.9% 10.8%  11.1% 11.3% 
Latvia 14.9% 0.0%  16.2% 0.0%  12.7% 0.0%  15.8% 0.0%  14.2% 0.0%  22.0% 0.0%  24.1% 0.0% 
Lithuania 94.4% 1.4%  88.4% 0.8%  94.2% 1.4%  88.3% 1.6%  85.6% 1.7%  69.6% 1.5%  61.8% 1.7% 
Luxembourg 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 
Malta No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  36.8% 0.0%  30.3% 0.0%  9.8% 0.0%  3.2% 0.0% 
Netherlands 23.0% 8.0%  22.9% 8.0%  23.5% 8.2%  22.6% 8.6%  24.5% 10.3%  27.1% 10.6%  30.2% 10.6% 
Poland 75.2% 2.8%  72.7% 3.3%  74.6% 3.4%  77.7% 4.3%  84.5% 4.3%  77.8% 4.6%  68.5% 4.3% 
Portugal 0.3% 2.1%  0.7% 1.9%  1.3% 1.8%  3.6% 1.8%  10.2% 2.2%  8.5% 2.5%  22.2% 2.4% 
Romania 49.7% 0.0%  48.3% 0.0%  28.6% 1.9%  19.6% 1.7%  35.4% 1.7%  42.3% 1.8%  40.9% 1.9% 
Slovakia 78.9% 0.8%  82.6% 1.0%  81.9% 1.0%  82.5% 1.1%  81.3% 1.1%  78.2% 1.0%  74.0% 1.0% 
Slovenia 1.8% 0.0%  0.3% 0.0%  0.4% 0.0%  1.0% 0.0%  0.8% 0.0%  0.4% 0.0%  5.5% 0.0% 
Spain 13.9% 9.3%  18.6% 9.2%  14.8% 8.9%  14.3% 9.3%  11.8% 10.7%  7.4% 11.2%  5.7% 11.4% 
Sweden 28.1% 3.1%  24.9% 2.9%  29.2% 3.2%  37.8% 3.4%  31.4% 3.1%  35.6% 3.5%  31.2% 3.4% 
United Kingdom 8.3% 12.3%  12.4% 12.1%  9.3% 11.3%  10.5% 11.6%  10.5% 10.1%  8.3% 9.1%  11.7% 9.7% 
                     
 




Table 9   European Solid Fuels import from Russia in percentages 2005-2017 
1) Share of imports of Solid Fuels that originated from Russia per EU member state per year (%) 
 and  
2) Contribution to total EU imports of Solid Fuels per EU member state per year (%) 
 2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  2017 
EU Member state 1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2)  1) 2) 
                     
Total EU* 20.7%   22.1%   26.0%   23.4%   26.6%   26.3%   33.8%  
Austria 0.5% 2.5%  2.1% 2.3%  0.0% 2.0%  2.1% 2.1%  0.8% 2.0%  6.9% 2.0%  3.8% 2.5% 
Belgium 10.2% 3.9%  14.4% 3.2%  4.6% 2.6%  1.1% 3.0%  21.6% 2.6%  25.8% 2.4%  27.7% 2.3% 
Bulgaria 27.6% 1.8%  20.5% 2.0%  35.5% 1.4%  28.4% 1.5%  49.5% 0.7%  77.6% 0.6%  81.7% 0.5% 
Croatia 30.8% 0.5%  28.2% 0.5%  25.7% 0.4%  0.0% 0.5%  17.3% 0.5%  58.7% 0.5%  77.3% 0.4% 
Cyprus 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0%  66.7% 0.0% 
Czech Republic 1.6% 0.9%  2.6% 1.4%  8.2% 1.5%  6.3% 1.7%  1.8% 1.6%  2.4% 2.5%  3.4% 2.6% 
Denmark 25.2% 2.6%  27.6% 3.2%  40.2% 3.3%  30.9% 2.8%  36.7% 2.1%  51.6% 1.4%  57.6% 1.7% 
Estonia 100.0% 0.0%  100.0% 0.1%  100.0% 0.0%  100.0% 0.0%  96.6% 0.0%  100.0% 0.0%  100.0% 0.0% 
Finland 53.5% 2.2%  67.6% 2.9%  75.7% 3.0%  71.5% 3.3%  68.1% 2.3%  57.5% 2.0%  63.4% 2.3% 
France 4.3% 9.1%  5.6% 8.0%  9.7% 8.1%  13.6% 7.9%  15.7% 8.1%  17.4% 6.9%  26.1% 8.4% 
Germany 18.4% 17.4%  17.7% 20.2%  23.1% 20.2%  19.4% 23.4%  22.2% 24.8%  26.7% 28.3%  36.1% 28.7% 
Greece 58.5% 0.3%  67.2% 0.2%  78.2% 0.1%  16.6% 0.2%  16.1% 0.2%  64.2% 0.1%  90.0% 0.2% 
Hungary 36.5% 1.0%  32.5% 1.0%  32.3% 0.9%  5.7% 0.9%  3.2% 0.7%  2.4% 0.8%  7.6% 1.0% 
Ireland 0.0% 1.3%  0.0% 0.9%  0.0% 1.0%  0.0% 1.0%  0.0% 1.0%  0.0% 1.2%  0.2% 1.1% 
Italy 4.4% 10.6%  3.2% 10.0%  6.4% 9.5%  11.8% 10.6%  20.9% 9.0%  20.0% 10.0%  34.6% 8.6% 
Latvia 89.4% 0.1%  100.0% 0.1%  97.7% 0.1%  53.2% 0.1%  97.5% 0.1%  100.0% 0.0%  98.2% 0.0% 
Lithuania 94.9% 0.1%  93.0% 0.2%  88.4% 0.1%  95.2% 0.2%  94.5% 0.2%  94.6% 0.1%  94.4% 0.2% 
Luxembourg 0.0% 0.1%  0.0% 0.1%  0.0% 0.1%  0.0% 0.0%  7.4% 0.0%  7.0% 0.0%  6.1% 0.0% 
Malta No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0%  No data 0.0% 
Netherlands 8.1% 5.7%  9.2% 5.6%  13.4% 5.9%  13.6% 5.4%  16.2% 5.6%  24.8% 8.6%  33.5% 8.2% 
Poland 68.3% 1.5%  50.5% 2.4%  65.1% 5.3%  61.4% 6.9%  60.1% 4.7%  57.4% 4.3%  64.7% 7.3% 
Portugal 0.0% 2.2%  2.6% 1.9%  1.5% 2.4%  0.3% 1.6%  0.3% 1.8%  0.1% 2.7%  5.2% 3.1% 
Romania 38.0% 2.0%  38.3% 2.4%  30.1% 0.9%  22.7% 0.8%  21.4% 0.8%  30.3% 1.0%  44.1% 0.9% 
Slovakia 34.9% 2.7%  30.7% 2.6%  29.5% 2.7%  22.0% 2.3%  22.9% 1.9%  27.8% 2.1%  27.2% 2.5% 
Slovenia 6.3% 0.3%  2.6% 0.3%  4.1% 0.3%  0.9% 0.3%  0.3% 0.3%  1.2% 0.2%  0.0% 0.2% 
Spain 17.1% 10.6%  11.3% 9.7%  11.6% 8.4%  11.7% 7.4%  17.2% 5.9%  21.3% 9.4%  26.0% 10.5% 
Sweden 23.5% 1.5%  20.5% 1.4%  20.5% 1.0%  19.3% 1.5%  20.8% 1.1%  19.0% 1.4%  17.8% 1.5% 
United Kingdom 39.9% 19.1%  46.8% 17.5%  49.0% 18.8%  37.9% 14.7%  39.2% 22.0%  35.7% 11.6%  42.1% 5.1% 
                     
 
*Percentage of total EU imports of Solid Fuels originating from Russia is the weighted average of EU imports 
 68 
 
